


مفهوم رأس المال الاجتماعي  
وأهميته بالنسبة للأراضي  
الفلسطينية المحتلة

معهد أبحاث السياسات الاقتصادية الفلسطيني (ماس)



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1		1-1
4		2-1
6		3-1
<b>9</b>		<b>-2</b>
9		1-2
13		2-2
18		3-2
24		4-2
25		<i>1-4-2</i>
26		<i>2-4-2</i>
27		<i>3-4-2</i>
<b>31</b>		<b>-3</b>
<b>35</b>		<b>-4</b>
<b>39</b>		<b>-5</b>
<b>43</b>		<b>-6</b>
<b>49</b>		
	<b>(PRISONER</b>	<b>:(1)</b>
<b>51</b>		<b>DILEMMA)</b>
51		.
54		.

<b>57</b>	<b>(2)</b>
57	.
62	.
<b>63</b>	

45	(2000-1972)	:1
45		:2
46	2004	:3
47	(2000-1972)	:4

51	" "	:1
52		:2
54		:3
55		:4
59	k & h	:5
60		:6

“ ”

∴  
∴

(Operational)

∴

”

”

(Romer, 2001)

.Outputs

Expectations

Inputs

:

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. ...

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x

.( ... )

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2000

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.(Subjective)

(Objective)

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-1

1-1

.(Social Capital)

.<sup>1</sup>

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.<sup>2</sup>

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1

.(Cotto, 1994)

(Jean Jakob)

1986

(Bowling alone)

(Robert Putnam) 2000

.(Grootaent, 1998, P.1)

2

1

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" ✧

3."

" ✧

(Community)

4."

" ✧

5."

" ✧

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7."

" ✧

8."

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3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
.(Bowles and Gintis, 2000)  
.(Weil, 2005, P.908)  
.3 2  
.(Putnam, 1993 P. 167)  
.(Fukuyamn, 1997 P. 378)

(Interdisciplinary) .

(Neoclassical Paradigm)

( )

(Game Theory)

9.

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9

( )

( )  
(Market Failure)

10

(Natural monopolies)

(Externalities)

(Public goods)  
(Coordination Failure)

---

10

( )

(State Failure)

11.

:

( )

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11

(Imperfect information)

### 3-1

“ ”

(Operational

:

.definition)

(Conceptual framework)

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(Neoclassical School)

( )

"

:

(Positive externality)

"

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**-2**

(Operational definition)

(3-2)

(1-2)

(2-2)

(4-2)

( )

**1-2**

<sup>13</sup>(Neoclassical growth model)

)

<sup>14</sup>(K/L

(Diminishing returns)

( )

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)

.(

.(Convergence hypothesis)

<sup>15</sup>.

(Solow, 1956)

(Ramzy-Cass-

<sup>13</sup>

.(Romer, 2006)

Koopman)

L

K

<sup>14</sup>

<sup>15</sup>

)

(

%7.5 %5.5

2000-1960

%3 %2

%1.5 %1

<sup>16</sup>.

7944

2000

35587)

4.4

( 47,200)

---

(K/L )

.15 (Weil, 2005)

<sup>16</sup>

%12

(

<sup>17</sup>.( 988)

<sup>18</sup>.

(R&D) <sup>19</sup>

(Efficiency)

17

18

(Externalities)

19

(R&D)

(Endogenous Growth Theory)

(Empirical)

20

:

**2-2**

:

:

---

20

(Technology and Efficiency)

:

( )

%20

%30

%10

%20

(

)

%10

(R&D)

%4-3

%1

(Inputs of production)

(Efficiency)

(

)

(Role

( ...

)

Model)

(Organized crimes)

<sup>22</sup>(FDI)

( )

<sup>23</sup>(Public good)

:

:

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(FDI)

<sup>22</sup>

(Independent Technology Learning Capacity) :

<sup>23</sup>

:

:

✦

( )

(rent-seeking)

24

:(idle resources)

✦

(Below

Underemployment  
.capacity)

:

✦

:(Technology blocking)

✦

24

(Rent)  
(Opportunity cost)

:

**3-2**

.(Creative destruction)

)

(

:

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.(4 ) .

26

(Parents-Teachers

Association)

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.(Coleman, 2000) <sup>26</sup>

(R&D)

( ) :

)

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.(

<sup>28</sup>.(Technology blocking)

.(Market failure)

(State failure)

---

.(Bowles and Gintis, 2000) <sup>28</sup>

(Externality)

( )

.( )

-

" :

(Externality)

29 "

(2006

25)

29

( )

Interaction

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.( ...

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(

.(5 )

(Fallacy of

composition)

)

.(

(Free rider)

4-2

)  
(

(By-product)

( ... )

(Bonding groups)

(Tragedy of  
)

Free rider

<sup>30</sup>

the commons)

(

.(Bridging groups)

. . . . .

**1-4-2**

.(asymmetric information)

31.

---

.(Fafchamps and mintan, 1949) (Barr, 2000)

<sup>31</sup>

2-4-2

( ... )

(Sub-optimal)

(Altruism)

(Prison's

dilemma)

(Coordination failure)  
(Market failure)

33

---

(Ostom, 1995) <sup>33</sup>

(Investment complementarily)

(Poverty

trap)

(Complementary investment)

(Conspicuous Consumption)

(Backward linkage)

.(Forward linkage)


34

---

.(Platteau, 1994)

<sup>34</sup>





(Expectations)

(Proxy)

(Inputs)

(Outputs)

· ...  
· ( ... )

) ( )  
· (

· ...  
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25 15  
(Outputs)

:

$$\ln E_i = a + b SC_i + c HC_i + d OC_i + e X_i + f Z_i + V_i \quad 37$$

:

- $E_i$
- $SC_i$
- $HC_i$
- $OC_i$
- $X_i$
- $Z_i$
- $V_i$

(Biased estimators)

(Least Squares)

:

(b, c, d)

.(Multicollinearity)

---

.(World Bank, 2004)

37

(Endogeneity)

(Exogenous variables)

38

(Endogenous variable)

(Grown Accounting)

(2)

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38

(Introduction to Econometrics, 1992)





(Social

<sup>39</sup> Infrastructure)

:

:

)

<sup>40</sup>.(

:

) .

: .( ...

---

.(Hall & Jones, 1999)

<sup>39</sup>

(Diversion)

<sup>40</sup>

( )  
(2003)

.(Rent-Seeking activities)

:

42 . . . .

43

44

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41

International

130

(Barro, 1997)

24

Country Risk Guide

42

43

(Instrument variables)

(Hall & Jones, 1999)

44

(Capital-Output)

.2 .





(2 )

(1 )

1986

<sup>45</sup> .2000

( 16 15)

(2 )

.2004 1997

(3 )

-1987)

<sup>45</sup>

1985	13384	1986	13728	1985	(1993
			13116	1988	12998
			.2000	1991	1990

:1

(2000-1972)

( )	
12780	1975-1972
13579	1980-1976
13158	1985-1981
13158	1990-1986
11535	1995-1991
10083	2000-1996

:

.(2005)

( 15)

:2

2004	1997	2004	1997	2004	1997	
9.5	9.7	9.0	9.5	10.0	10.0	
9.4	9.5	8.9	9.3	10.0	9.8	
9.7	10.0	9.2	9.8	10.1	10.2	

.( ) 2005

:

(2004)

:3

%34.9	%12.4	
%38.8	%10.2	
%50.8	%12.5	
%39.0	%16.3	
%50.0	%13.9	
%52.0	%34.5	

.Kaufman, Kray and Mostpuzzi (2005) :

.(Percentile rank)

%12.4

%12.4

%87.6

(4 )<sup>46</sup>.

(2000-1972)

:4

* (2)	* (1)	
%24	%88	1975-1972
%21	%73	1980-1976
%21	%79	1985-1980
%13	%60	1990-1986
%13	%75	1995-1991
%16	%89	2000-1996

(1) \*

(2)

:

:

:





:(1)

**(Prisoner Dilemma)**

:1

		<b>B</b>	
<b>A</b>		-3,-3	0,-6
		-6,0	-1,-1

( ) .



$$(U_B = \pi_B) \quad B \quad (U_A = \pi_A)$$


.(Individualism)

$$U_A = (1 - \alpha) \pi_A + \alpha \pi_B$$

$$U_B = (1 - \alpha) \pi_B + \alpha \pi_A$$

$$1 > \alpha > 0$$

.(Altruism)



(inferior)

(d,d)

.(a,a

(Optimal)

(a,a)

$$\alpha > \frac{d+b}{c+b}$$

$$\alpha > \frac{c-a}{c+b}$$

.d + b

c - a



:4

		B	
A		(100,100)	(30,70)
		(70,30)	(50,50)

(50)

.(100)

( )

.(70)

(30)

A

:B

B

.(70

60)

.(30

50)

A

.(100,100)



(2)

d

$$(1) Y(t) = (1 - d) K(t)^\alpha H(t)^\beta [A(t) - L(t)]^{1 - \alpha - \beta}$$

t  
Y  
K  
H  
A  
L  
 $\alpha, \beta$

- (2)  $\dot{K}(t) = I(t) - SK(t)$
- (3)  $I(t) = S(t) = s_k Y(t)$
- (4)  $H(t) = s_H Y(t)$
- (5)  $\dot{L}(t) = L(t)$
- (6)  $\dot{A}(t) = gA(t)$

$$I(t)$$

$$S(t)$$

$$\delta$$

$$S_K$$

$$S_H$$

$$g$$

$$(7) \quad y = \frac{Y}{AL}, \quad k = \frac{K}{AL}, \quad h = \frac{H}{AL}$$

.(AL)

$$(8) \quad y = (1-d) k^\alpha h^\beta \quad AL \quad (1)$$

$$k = \frac{K}{AL}$$

$$(9) \quad \dot{k} = S_K (1-d) k^\alpha h^\beta - (n+g+s) k$$

$$: \quad h = \frac{K}{AL}$$

$$(10) \quad \dot{h} = S_H (1-d) k^\alpha h^\beta - (n+g+s) h$$

$$\dot{k} = \dot{h} = 0$$

$$(11) \quad k|_{\dot{k}=0} = \left[ \frac{(1-d)S_k}{(n+g+s)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} h^{\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha}}$$

$$(12) \quad k|_{\dot{h}=0} = \left[ \frac{(n+g+S)}{S_H(1-d)} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} h^{\frac{1-\beta}{\alpha}}$$

:


$$\frac{Jk}{Jh} > 0, \frac{J^2k}{Jh^2} < 0 \quad : (11)$$

$$\frac{Jk}{Jh} > 0, \frac{J^2k}{Jh^2} > 0 \quad : (12)$$

.(5)

**k & h**

**:5**



(Stable  
(h,k)

(k,h) E


$\dot{k} = 0$

$\dot{h} = 0$

equilibrium)

$(\frac{Jh}{Jk} > 0, \frac{Jk}{Jh} > 0)$

:6



$E_1$  (6 )

$h_1$   $k_1$

d

$\dot{h} = 0$   $\dot{k} = 0$

$$\begin{array}{cc}
 \dot{h} = 0 & \frac{Jk}{Jd} > 0 & \dot{k} = 0 & \frac{Jk}{Jd} < 0 \\
 & k_2 & & E_2 \\
 & & & .h_2
 \end{array}$$

(d)

.y            h k

$$(1) Y(t) = K(t)^\alpha H(t)^\beta [A(t) L(t)]^{1-\alpha-\beta}$$

.(A)

: t

$$(2) \frac{\dot{Y}}{Y} = \frac{\alpha \dot{k}}{k} + \beta \frac{\dot{H}}{H} + (1-\alpha-\beta) \frac{\dot{A}}{A} + (1-\alpha-\beta) \frac{\dot{L}}{L}$$

$$\frac{\dot{L}}{L} \quad (2)$$

:

$$(3) \frac{g_y}{L} = \frac{\alpha g_k}{L} + \beta g_{\frac{H}{L}} + (1-\alpha-\beta) g_A$$

:  $g_A$

$$(4) g_A = \frac{1}{1-\alpha-\beta} + \frac{g_y}{L} - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha-\beta} \frac{g_K}{L} - \beta g_{\frac{H}{L}}$$

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