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PALESTINE ECONOMIC POLICY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (MAS)

Reconstructing Gaza through Spatial Planning:

Comparative Readings of Gaza Reconstruction Plans and Proposals





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Introduction

As the devastating war on the Gaza Strip continues since 2023, an unprecedented surge of “day-after” political and governance initiatives, reconstruction plans, and proposals have emerged from a wide range of actors—international, regional, Palestinian, as well as corporate interests and research centers. This dynamic is not limited to political or academic spheres alone; it involves actors from diverse sectors, reflecting a state of both direct and indirect “competition” over shaping the future of Gaza—its infrastructure, governance structures, population distribution, and the limits of what is deemed possible for Palestinians in the public domain.

Several Israeli visions and plans have also emerged regarding the future of the Gaza Strip—either directly or implicitly—through Israeli think tanks and security institutions. While analyzing such proposals from a colonial perspective is indeed important, this paper does not address them within its primary analytical scope, given their distinct structural and political nature. These proposals are not presented as frameworks for cooperation or potential partnership, but rather reflect policies of imposed realities.

This paper, prepared by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), serves as a concise analytical reference on the reconstruction plans tabled to date. The paper adopts a comparative critical review of plans and initiatives developed by various entities. These are to be presented and debated within a focused group of specialists and decision-makers, with a central emphasis on spatial and reconstruction dimensions—not as merely technical matters, but as domains intertwined with political, structural, and future-oriented considerations aimed at directing the shape of life and governance in Gaza over the coming years.

Accordingly, the paper establishes a set of evaluative criteria for comparison, the most prominent of which include:

- The degree to which the plans align with Palestinian sovereignty, liberation, and national interest.
- The extent to which they address the consequences of the war.
- Whether and how they hold the Israeli occupation accountable for destruction.
- The plans’ feasibility and applicability, and donor guarantees’ credibility.
- The identification of beneficiaries, the developmental and economic dimensions, and how reconstruction is linked to politics.
- Other criteria are detailed throughout the paper.

While some of these plans present themselves in humanitarian or developmental language, they often carry implicit—or at times explicit—visions of how life in Gaza is to be reorganized: Who controls the space? Who oversees the population? What gets rebuilt, how, and for whom? Infrastructure in this context is not merely constructed with cement—it is shaped by networks of control and governance that reflect power balances, funding conditions, and foreign interventions. Understanding these plans thus requires a dual reading: a technical one that addresses implementation models and tools, and an analytical one that explores what lies behind the discourse—the underlying power structures and contexts being reconstituted through “reconstruction” as a political, economic, and spatial process.

This paper reviews and analyzes ten major spatially and reconstruction-oriented plans through multiple dimensions: implementation models, Palestinian agency, political and security frameworks, and how urban space is addressed, whether as a site of authority, resistance, or subjugation. A comparative matrix accompanies this analysis to offer a shared basis for discussion and to clarify the overlaps and divergences between the proposed models. The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations deemed necessary for moving forward. This effort is intended to assist decision-makers in shaping their visions and selecting the most viable options under conditions of occupation. The paper's recommendations and the discussions it sparks are intended to provide a foundational platform for future policy formulation.

1. Section One: Review of Plans and Critical Reading

This section presents eleven major plans, all of which converge in their emphasis on spatial planning and reconstruction as tools for reshaping space and the political structure in Gaza. Each plan is given a critical summary spanning one and a half to two pages, covering its conceptual framework, implementation approach, the role of the Palestinian actor, timelines, and its implicit or explicit political dimensions. The aim of this section is to offer a critical reading of how visions and realities are constructed within these plans—what they reveal about who is planning Gaza, in whose interest, and under what conditions.

1.1 RAND ARC Plan

The RAND ARC plan is one of the most ambitious initiatives proposed over the past two decades to redesign the Palestinian urban space according to a centralized vision that positions infrastructure as a driver of both economic and political development. First introduced in 2005 by the American RAND Corporation, the plan emerged within the context of heightened international discourse on the two-state solution. It revolves around the creation of an “urban and developmental arc” extending from the north to the south of the West Bank and connecting to the Gaza Strip, forming a backbone for the future Palestinian state's urban and economic structure.

The Central Vision of Spatial Development:

The plan envisions the establishment of a developmental urban corridor known as “*The Arc*”—a linear urban-infrastructure axis starting in Jenin in the north, passing through Nablus, Ramallah, (skirting) Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron, and then branching southward toward the Gaza Strip. This corridor would act as the structural spine for integrated urban development. New cities and population centers would be built along the arc and connected by a modern, high-speed transport network including railways and expressways.

The plan aims to accommodate expected Palestinian population growth over the next two decades through the development of new, integrated neighborhoods that combine housing, work, and services while preserving green spaces and protecting agricultural and environmental land from unregulated sprawl.

Proposed Infrastructure Components:

- **Railways:** A high-speed rail line running the length of the arc, connecting major Palestinian cities and facilitating daily and commercial mobility.
- **Highways:** Central highways linking new cities to existing urban centers, along with secondary roads connecting inner neighborhoods to the transport spine.
- **Border Gates:** Development of strategic access points in Jenin, Qalqilya, Tubas, southern Hebron, and Jericho to connect the Palestinian state with neighboring countries.
- **Ports and Airports:** Construction of a seaport and an international airport in Gaza to support trade and tourism and connect Palestine to the world.

While the plan's primary geographic focus is the West Bank, Gaza is considered an essential component—as the “southern terminus” of the arc. However, the approach to Gaza is cautious, due to its high population density, limited space, and the reality of blockade. The plan proposes enhancing Gaza's infrastructure to improve its connectivity with the West Bank, upgrading the port, expanding roads, and introducing more efficient urban planning to address land scarcity.

Implementation Stakeholders:

The plan envisions a broad partnership for implementing the arc, involving:

- **The Palestinian National Authority:** As the central planning and executing entity responsible for institutional coordination.
- **Israel:** An indirect yet essential partner, particularly regarding borders, security, and movement facilitation.
- **The International Community:** Especially the Quartet (United States, European Union, Russia, United Nations) and bilateral donors, considered key financial and political backers.
- **Private Sector and NGOs:** To support investment, financing, and implementation of social and service projects.

Underlying Structural Assumptions:

- **Financing:** The plan estimates a total cost of \$33 billion over 10 years (approximately \$3.3 billion annually), to be secured through a mix of international aid, private investment, and institutional support.
- **Population Growth:** Assumes continued population increase, necessitating expanded housing and services.
- **Political Stability:** Relies on the assumption that a political agreement will be reached to establish a sovereign Palestinian state.
- **Freedom of Movement:** Success depends on the availability of unrestricted movement within and beyond Palestinian territories.
- **Regional Integration:** Envisions the arc as a regional connector to Arab capitals and cities like Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus.

The plan stresses that the project's success hinges on the existence of capable and effective Palestinian institutions. Infrastructure is not merely a developmental project but a political component of state-building. The plan further argues that infrastructure should be designed and

managed by Palestinians and serve as a practical symbol of national sovereignty, even if the political status remains suspended or fragmented.

At the same time, the plan acknowledges the fragility and complexity of the political context and that realizing this vision will require sustained international political support, with careful attention to on-the-ground developments.

Critical Reading of the Plan

At first glance, the RAND ARC plan presents itself as a strategic vision for rebuilding the future of Palestine by creating an urban-economic artery that connects the West Bank with Gaza and organizes development within a functional, modern framework. However, upon closer examination, it reveals a hidden political architecture that redefines the concept of the Palestinian state, from a sovereign entity to a carefully engineered corridor, subject to management, regulation, and internationalization.

Most notably, the plan does not originate from a Palestinian political reading, nor notions of sovereignty, liberation, or self-determination. Rather, it is driven by a functional logic: How can a network of transport and services be developed to organize the Palestinian population within an integrated regional structure? In other words, the state in this plan is not built politically—it is drawn architecturally.

Instead of infrastructure serving as a tool to expand Palestinian sovereign space, it becomes the end goal itself: the “state” is the “arc,” funding is its catalyst, and security coordination with the occupation becomes its implicit strategic condition. Although Gaza is included as the southern terminus of the arc, its integration into the plan reflects managed absorption rather than holistic inclusion. Gaza is treated as a densely populated block with limited room for expansion. The plan proposes connecting it to the West Bank “as much as possible,” yet without dismantling the blockade or addressing the occupation. No genuine solutions are offered for the geographic or security disconnection—only hypothetical corridors, contingent on conditions. This vision reproduces Gaza as a “special case,” always subject to regional dynamics or Israeli decision-making, despite the plan’s language around sovereignty and independent infrastructure.

The implementation stakeholders identified in the plan—the Palestinian Authority, Israel, the Quartet, international donors, and the private sector—are all positioned as equal partners. This reshapes the concept of governance into a form of “functional coordination” rather than sovereign authority. Under this model, Palestine becomes a zone governed by multi-stakeholder management, where no single entity holds ultimate authority. What emerges is a scenario of “managed non-sovereignty,” (Hanafi, 2009) with the arc serving as a blueprint for a state designed to be governable, rather than free.

Even if one assumes good faith on the part of the plan’s authors—who are primarily international urban planners and engineers—the logic of the plan exhibits a glaring disregard for the colonial structure that underpins the reality in Gaza and the West Bank. It ignores the violent tools through which land is fragmented, movement is restricted, and space is confiscated. Can an “urban arc”

function on land riddled with checkpoints, enclaves, and separation walls? The plan's failure to engage with such fundamental questions renders it not only weak but ultimately detached, relying on an impossible security matrix to be realized.

Although the plan claims not to be a “detailed blueprint” but rather a “framework for dialogue,” its structure carries a dangerous symbolic weight: it reframes the Palestinian national dream into a corridor of mobility and development, not a project of liberation. The state here is reduced to an engineered space leaning more toward a domesticated “Singaporean model” than a liberatory “Algerian model,” for example.

In short, while RAND ARC is presented as a futuristic vision for Palestine, it actually reproduces a political project based on a technically feasible state, not a politically rightful one. Gaza is included as a conditional appendage, the Palestinian Authority becomes a technical executor, and infrastructure substitutes for sovereignty. This is not merely an urban planning proposal—it is a model for reimagining Palestine as a “field for urban investment,” not as a liberation cause.

1.2 RAND 2025 Plan

Published in April 2025, the RAND “Spatial Vision for Palestine” plan emerges amid a highly complex political and on-the-ground reality, as the Palestinian landscape is being redrawn in the aftermath of war. The plan responds to increasing spatial fragmentation, infrastructure collapse, and the absence of any real political horizon. Despite these challenges, it offers an ambitious vision for a future Palestinian state from a spatial and architectural perspective—one that seeks to reorganize Palestinian geography into a unified, livable, and spatially coherent structure. In this vision, urban form becomes a mirror of sovereignty and control. The plan aims to create an integrated spatial system that addresses the fragmentation imposed by the Oslo Accords and lays the foundation for effective movement between towns and villages, and between the West Bank and Gaza.

The vision is structured around five core pillars:

- **Regional Connectivity:** Establishing a multimodal transport network—including BRT (Bus Rapid Transit) systems, ring roads, and bridges—to reduce travel time and enhance inter-city connectivity.
- **Urban-Centered Development:** Supporting urban hubs as centers of production, services, and housing, while promoting population growth within these hubs to protect agricultural and natural lands.
- **Environmental Sustainability:** Restoring valleys, managing waste, protecting natural resources, and linking development to ecological infrastructure.
- **Economic Integration:** Creating geographically distributed industrial, commercial, and tourism hubs to avoid centralization and enhance economic justice.
- **Manageable Borders:** Envisioning a state with defined borders and Palestinian-controlled crossings to facilitate trade and movement.

The plan adopts contemporary urban planning models that emphasize smart density, mixed-use zoning, walkability, and green public space, aiming to institutionalize the idea of the “sustainable Palestinian city.” Key proposals include:

- Expanding urban development through concentric zones around cities instead of chaotic sprawl.
- Developing public and cultural service centers near transit corridors.
- Protecting agricultural and ecological zones from urban encroachment.
- Advancing detailed planning in Jerusalem, Jericho, Ramallah, and Bethlehem—while respecting their historical character.

At the heart of this vision lies the concept of spatial sovereignty, where the capacity for urban planning is tied directly to governance capabilities, administrative skill, and territorial control. The plan assumes a gradual Palestinian reassertion of authority over Areas C and B, framing this as a prerequisite for launching development projects.

The plan calls for building a Palestinian institutional system based on:

- A unified and modern land registry.
- A centralized planning body with cross-governorate coordination capacity.
- Technical and technological capacity within local institutions.
- Independent management of borders and crossings, particularly in Gaza and the West Bank.

The plan emphasizes that institutional control over land is a “precondition for operational sovereignty,” and critiques the current situation, which is marked by a lack of documentation and fragmented legal frameworks—factors that hinder infrastructure and planning projects.

Transformation, according to the plan, should not be immediate, but phased through politically feasible and functionally necessary projects. Recommendations include:

- Starting with small-scale, implementable projects (e.g., solid waste, mobility, water).
- Building technical capacity in planning, surveying, and engineering.
- Strengthening partnerships with donors while ensuring Palestinian decision-making autonomy.
- Launching a national dialogue on planning and development priorities.
- Reforming the customs and border system as a cornerstone of economic sovereignty.

The plan acknowledges that implementing these projects will require coordination with Israeli authorities, especially concerning permits, crossings, and services that pass through areas under Israeli control.

While the plan rests on the idea of geographic unity between the West Bank and Gaza, it recognizes that Gaza faces additional complications: blockade, widespread destruction, restricted access, and a volatile legal and political status. Nevertheless, the plan treats Gaza as a full component of the future spatial map and recommends:

- Enhancing connectivity between Gaza and the West Bank through multimodal land corridors.
- Expanding and rehabilitating crossings, especially with Egypt and Israel.
- Developing a modern waste management system and rebuilding water and electricity infrastructure.
- Improving the flexibility of Gaza's planning to adapt to shifting political conditions.
- The plan is based on the assumption that a peace process or political agreement will eventually redefine Palestinian control over land. Yet, it acknowledges this is currently absent and therefore proposes:
 - Adopting adaptive planning strategies that accommodate political fragility.
 - Working within the bounds of what is "possible" without waiting for a final settlement.
 - Enhancing international coordination to reduce obstacles.

However, the plan avoids directly addressing the political impact of Israeli settlement expansion and fails to present clear criteria for prioritizing projects, leaving room for selective approaches that are not necessarily grounded in justice or resistance.

Critical Reading of the Plan

The RAND 2025 plan appears to be an advanced attempt to update the international vision of Palestine's future through the lens of spatial planning. Yet at its core, it reproduces the notion of a technically feasible but politically deferred state. Sovereignty is reduced to a function, and the state is reimagined as a network of roads and ecological systems, making it closely aligned with the earlier "Arc" plan. The plan maintains the conditions of occupation, treating them as temporary "obstacles" rather than as structural colonial realities.

Sovereignty in this vision is framed through administrative tools—a land registry, border systems, and a centralized planning agency—rather than through confronting the occupation or dismantling the regime of closure and control. This implies that the plan presumes continued Israeli dominance over border crossings, Area C, and freedom of movement. As such, sovereignty becomes a conditional horizon, dependent on negotiation outcomes rather than rights-based claims. It is redefined as a procedural structure rather than an inherent right. More critically, this framework transforms Israel from an occupying power into an "administrative partner" with whom permits, borders, funding, and security coordination must be continually negotiated. Israel's presence is thus recast not as the source of the problem but as the determinant of execution speed and efficiency.

The plan engages in a form of political sanitization of tragedy (Yacobi, 2012), using urban planning tools to delay or reframe the conflict. Blockade, settlements, and geographic fragmentation are discussed as "obstacles to mobility and connectivity," rather than as systems of domination. Here, planning language plays a functional role in depoliticizing the occupation. Palestine is reorganized not through the right to self-determination, but through improved flows of goods, people, waste, water, etc., without dismantling the underlying structures of territorial and infrastructural control.

Although Gaza is included as part of the state, its integration follows a logic of "urban flexibility" rather than a genuine desire to lift the siege. It is mentioned repeatedly, but always within a managerial framework—waste management, mobility enhancement, infrastructure repair—without any political

proposition to end the blockade or reverse the imposed separation. Gaza is redefined as a “sensitive planning case,” rather than a center of resistance or a core political unit. Its geographic connection to the West Bank is presented as an engineering option, not a sovereign imperative.

The plan emphasizes the need for environmental sustainability and smart resource management, especially water and energy. Yet it fails to acknowledge that Palestine’s environmental crisis is first and foremost a colonial problem: the occupation controls groundwater, energy resources, and agricultural land, and produces environmental degradation through settlement expansion. Ignoring this context turns sustainability into a bureaucratic concept devoid of emancipatory potential.

The plan also assumes that “state-building begins now”, even in the absence of a political horizon. However, this vision relies on the existence of strong international and domestic will to support the project, something that remains deeply uncertain, especially in light of the global silence and marginalization in the face of genocide. What the plan fails to acknowledge is that initiatives that do not confront systems of domination are either frozen or reabsorbed into the terms set by the occupier.

In short, RAND 2025 reimagines the Palestinian state as a flexible spatial blueprint, built on gradualism, keeping politics at the margins and placing planning at the center. Gaza appears as a critical zone rather than a decision-making arena. Sovereignty is disassembled into tools, and the occupation is treated as a navigable reality rather than a structure to be dismantled. It is a plan that may seem “smart” in terms of systems, but it is void of the fundamental questions of liberation and self-determination.

1.3 Gaza 2050 Plan

The “Gaza 2050” plan offers a long-term, comprehensive strategic vision that aims to transform Gaza from an isolated, crisis-stricken area into an economically and intellectually vibrant hub, connected regionally and globally, and integrated geographically and economically with the West Bank. The plan is led by Palestinian private sector actors, with technical support from AECOM and Portland Trust, and in coordination with the National Spatial Planning Unit (NSPU), involving over 300 individuals and institutions from the public and private sectors, as well as civil society. This diversity of stakeholders is presented as one of the plan’s main strengths, making it a rare example of a homegrown initiative—unlike the many externally imposed visions.

The plan is grounded in concepts such as the knowledge economy, productive specialization, integrated spatial planning, and the linkage between urban development and economic growth. It assumes that Gaza holds significant human and natural potential that can be strategically mobilized—if national political consensus, institutional support, and relative stability are achieved. General Vision and Objectives:

- To build a “Gaza connected to Palestine and the world,” economically integrated with the West Bank, and regionally linked through logistical corridors, trade routes, and ports.
- By 2050, the plan envisions a middle-income Palestinian economy, capable of creating around 1.1 million jobs in high-value-added sectors such as knowledge, logistics, precision industry, and trade.

- To establish a coherent urban identity in Gaza through urban containment—preventing urban sprawl and protecting agricultural land and the environment.
- To redefine Gaza from a permanent humanitarian burden to a driver of development and a hub for investment and innovation.
- To form a sustainable urban fabric connecting Gaza City and Deir al-Balah as a central urban spine, symbolically representing the vision of a modern, global Palestinian city.
- Spatial and Development Dimensions:
 - The plan proposes the development of specialized industrial zones such as the Al-Muntar area, envisioned as a logistical and industrial hub linking Gaza to regional trade networks.
 - Spatial planning components include the creation of high-density employment centers, and the upgrading of infrastructure for transport, energy, water, and sanitation.
 - It emphasizes sustainability principles, including the preservation of agricultural land and improving the efficiency of natural resource use.
 - The spatial vision combines urban renewal in deteriorated areas with planned expansion to meet employment, housing, and mobility needs.
 - It aims to provide a dignified living environment aligned with global standards of urban planning.
- Timeline and Implementation Mechanisms:
 - The vision extends to 2050, making it the longest-term framework compared to other plans (typically spanning 5–15 years).
 - While it does not present a detailed short-, medium-, or long-term timeline, it introduces the concept of “catalyst projects” to be implemented gradually through an accumulative transformational logic.
 - The plan emphasizes the need for follow-up feasibility studies and highlights the importance of institutional flexibility to accommodate evolving political and economic dynamics.
 - It proposes coordination mechanisms among actors without external oversight, within a nationally owned institutional framework.
- Implementing Actors and Governance:
 - The Palestinian private sector is positioned as the primary driver: initiating, planning, and executing the projects.
 - Other participating entities include national government institutions, the Spatial Planning Unit, civil society organizations, and local and international technical experts.
 - The plan envisions internal Palestinian partnership, requiring political and institutional consensus.
 - There is no explicit mention of donors or international organizations in terms of administration or funding, reflecting an intent toward sovereign ownership. However, the plan does not specify governance models or detailed mechanisms for oversight and financing.
- Political and Security Assumptions:
 - The plan treats the blockade and political division as ongoing structural challenges, without offering direct political solutions.
 - It implicitly assumes a purely Palestinian governance structure, suggesting that Palestinian actors can coordinate implementation between Gaza and the West Bank.
 - It does not propose security arrangements (such as police roles or international guarantees), which could indicate either a deliberate omission or deferral to future negotiations.
 - It focuses on development as a pathway to transcend current limitations, without awaiting a comprehensive political resolution.

- Discourse and Conceptual Language:
- The narrative is rich in terms like “Global Palestine,” “knowledge economy,” “development engines,” “urban containment,” “spatial vision,” “generational transformation,” and “national initiative.”
- The language is technical and planning-oriented, but carries a subtle political symbolism, balancing realism with ambition.
- The discourse is non-confrontational, avoids assigning blame or directly referencing occupation, instead focusing on possibilities and opportunities.

Critical Reading of the Plan

The Gaza 2050 plan stands out as one of the most ambitious and long-term visions among all proposed reconstruction and spatial planning frameworks for the Gaza Strip. It does not treat the post-war period as merely a temporary emergency or urgent humanitarian context but instead aims to redefine Gaza as a functional economic-urban entity—connected to both Palestine and the world. Yet, despite this ambitious and hopeful outlook, which carries both technical optimism and a sense of national ownership, the plan raises several critical issues concerning the political context, security assumptions, institutional capacities, and the overall feasibility of its vision given the current structural realities.

The plan undoubtedly reflects an impressive capacity for indigenous Palestinian vision-building and is presented as a sovereign declaration that the Palestinian private sector is capable of envisioning an independent future for Gaza without waiting for international actors. In this sense, the plan can be seen as a symbolic act of reclaiming Gaza as a domain for national forward-planning. However, this ambition—while politically and morally significant—often lacks concrete pathways for implementation, especially amid the ongoing blockade, internal political division, and the absence of a unified Palestinian body able to guarantee execution or secure funding.

The plan implicitly relies on an “assumption of stability”, without providing a thorough analysis of what would be required to achieve it. Key questions remain unaddressed: How will the blockade be lifted? What will Gaza’s relationship with Israel look like in this context? Who ensures the integration of Gaza and the West Bank? Who provides internal and external security? The vision seems to assume that political issues will resolve themselves, a position that is overly optimistic and inconsistent with the Palestinian experience of the past two decades.

Although the leadership of the private sector is important, the plan fails to deeply engage with existing social inequalities or outline mechanisms to ensure that marginalized groups benefit from future development. There is no clear treatment of land distribution, refugee rights, or strategies to empower women and vulnerable populations within the proposed knowledge economy. It appears to assume that economic transformation will automatically generate inclusive opportunities, without outlining policies for redistribution or direct support to those most affected by decades of conflict.

The plan proudly references the participation of more than 300 Palestinian individuals and institutions, which is no minor achievement. Still, its governance and accountability mechanisms remain vague. Who will oversee the implementation? Who will ensure that the vision remains

aligned with its original goals? What legal or regulatory framework will govern resource allocation or guarantee transparency? The absence of such specifics renders the plan institutionally fragile, despite its compelling vision.

The language used in the plan is flexible and forward-looking, but it often practices a form of “political neutralization” of the Israeli occupation. The occupation is only mentioned as a structural challenge, without any direct accountability for its role in undermining development or spatial connectivity with the West Bank. While such neutralization may be technically beneficial in avoiding international obstruction, it weakens the plan’s analytical strength, leaving it somewhat detached from the material and political structures of control imposed on Gaza.

In short, “Gaza 2050” marks a remarkable moment of Palestinian sovereign expression—an assertion of the right to urban and economic planning free from international impositions. However, despite its high aspirations, the plan remains in urgent need of deeper political and security engagement, more concrete institutional detailing, and clear, actionable implementation tools and timelines. It may serve well as a general framework for negotiation or advocacy, but it cannot materialize without addressing the political, legal, and institutional architecture needed to sustain it.

1.4 IRDNA – Integrated Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment Plan

The IRDNA plan represents one of the first institutional efforts to assess the scale of destruction and identify sectoral and financial priorities for Gaza’s reconstruction after a year of relentless bombardment and tightened blockade. It was prepared by a joint team from the World Bank, the European Union, and the United Nations, utilizing a mix of remote sensing technologies, government data, field sources, and community testimonies, as well as mobile phone and social media data. This approach reflects a broad reliance on non-traditional analysis tools to overcome limited field access.

The plan estimates that the damage to fixed capital amounts to \$29.9 billion—nearly twice the Palestinian GDP before the war. Indirect economic losses (in output and employment) are also substantial, though not all are detailed. These translate into an 83% economic contraction in Gaza for 2024, shrinking Gaza’s contribution to the Palestinian GDP from 17% to less than 3%—a shift the report describes as “catastrophic and unprecedented.”

The report covers 18 sectors, giving clear priority to essential infrastructure, including:

- Energy: Near-total destruction, with complete failure of networks and generation capacity.
- Water and Sanitation (WASH): Damage in some areas exceeds 90% of infrastructure.
- Health: Widespread targeting of hospitals and clinics, creating a critical gap in primary and secondary care.
- Transport: Major roads and bridges, especially in northern Gaza, were largely destroyed.
- Environment: The report estimates over 22 million tons of debris cover large areas, much of it contaminated with chemicals and unexploded ordnance.

In the social sectors, while physical damage in some areas (like education) was not extensive, the report highlights an urgent need to restore humanitarian and social services, especially in:

- Psychosocial support.
- Care for survivors of gender-based violence.
- Rehabilitation for the injured and disabled.
- Services related to reproductive health and persons with disabilities.
- The plan outlines three timeframes for action:
- Short term (0–3 years): Focus on debris removal, restarting power and water stations, and restoring a minimum level of public services.
- Medium term (3–7 years): Includes rebuilding schools and hospitals, repairing road and water networks, and restoring local governance institutions.
- Long term (7–10 years and beyond): Centers on rebuilding the economy, transitioning to sustainable infrastructure, and developing a “resilient” urban system while addressing large-scale environmental impact.

Methodological Pillars of the Plan:

- Use of the Conflict Recovery Framework (CRF): This framework promotes multi-stakeholder coordination and emphasizes integrating humanitarian and economic responses under a long-term vision.
- Partnership with the private sector: The plan opens the door to major investments in transport, energy, housing, and water, without providing clear governance models or mechanisms for community accountability.
- Flexibility and Change Management: The document stresses the need for adaptive responses and continuous data updates due to the “volatile and unstable” nature of the situation on the ground.
- On financing, the plan calls for the formation of an international financing coalition, involving donor countries, international financial institutions, and the private sector. It recommends exploring innovative tools such as joint guarantees or results-based financing.
- The plan outlines key priorities as prerequisites for initiating reconstruction, including:
- Clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXOs).
- Environmental cleanup and soil rehabilitation.
- Institutional protection for the most vulnerable groups—particularly women, children, and internally displaced persons.

Critical Reading of the Plan

Despite the IRDNA plan’s detailed data and sectoral estimates, its conceptual framework and technocratic language contribute to depoliticizing the nature of the destruction. The outcomes of war are translated into “material losses” that are repairable, stripped of their colonial context. The systematic genocide inflicted on Gaza is reduced to indicators of economic loss and fiscal contraction, without reference to the political responsibility or the structural forces that produced this devastation, namely settler colonialism and ongoing aggression.

The plan offers a “technocratic” vision of reconstruction, where disaster is managed through a multi-stakeholder logic. In this model, the public space is restructured through donor partnerships, international organizations, and potentially private sector actors, while the Palestinian actor, represented by the Palestinian Authority, is relegated to a technical coordinating role rather than a sovereign leadership position. This raises a fundamental question: Who sets the priorities for reconstruction? Who decides where hospitals are built? Who controls the funding sources? Does this vision respond to Palestinians’ right to rebuild their society, or is it another mechanism for reproducing control through conditional, internationally managed tools?

Within this context, the “Conflict Recovery Framework” (CRF) appears as a functional concept for managing reconstruction without enabling any political transformation. It perpetuates what could be termed an “extended emergency logic,” (Duffield, 2007) wherein Palestinians remain indefinitely under technical and humanitarian custodianship, absent any serious discussion of rights, sovereignty, or justice.

Moreover, the plan promotes private sector involvement as essential to successful reconstruction, yet fails to clarify governance mechanisms or ensure social justice. This model—repeated in similar plans—effectively privatizes reconstruction and converts collective suffering into funding and investment opportunities, forming what may be described as a “disaster-driven emergency economy.” More precisely, this phenomenon is known as “disaster capitalism.” (Klein, 2007)

It is also notable that the plan avoids addressing issues of sovereignty over land, the dismantling of the closure regime, or accountability for the occupying power. Instead, Gaza is treated as an empty space awaiting “reconstruction,” not as a colonized territory subjected to systematic violence. This deliberate omission invites a more alarming interpretation: that Gaza may be turned into a testing ground for the reproduction of post-colonial governance tools.

While the plan ostensibly aims to address comprehensive recovery, the presence of Palestinians as a society—not merely as an administrative entity—appears fragile. There is no mention of the role of municipalities, civil society, or local movements. Palestinians are once again rendered recipients of services, not agents actively participating in rebuilding their society and shaping their cities.

In short, while the IRDNA plan is valuable as an assessment tool, it is far from neutral. It functions as a map for reconfiguring international intervention in Gaza, institutionalizing a separation between reconstruction and sovereignty, between recovery and independence. It is a plan rich in data, figures, and percentages—but lacking in acknowledgment of the political structures that caused the catastrophe, and ultimately contributes to the reproduction of “reconstruction as management,” rather than “reconstruction as liberation.”

1.5 UN-Habitat Plan

The UN-Habitat plan represents one of the earliest and most prominent efforts to formulate an urban reconstruction vision for the Gaza Strip. It draws on field challenges and leverages the UN’s experience in similar contexts (such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon), while also aligning with Palestinian national policies—particularly the National Urban Policy (2023) and the National Development Plan (2021–2023). Although still in a preliminary phase and largely reliant on

remote sensing due to the absence of field presence, the plan lays out a conceptual framework for urban recovery centered on the residential neighborhood as the unit of planning. It advocates for building “a greener, more resilient, and more inclusive Gaza.”

The plan aims to chart a transitional path from emergency humanitarian response to long-term urban recovery through a phased approach that includes housing reconstruction, infrastructure reactivation, and protection of natural resources—within a comprehensive urban vision. It emphasizes the necessity of Palestinian leadership, backed by national policies, and calls for broad community engagement through a neighborhood-based model rather than fragmented sectoral interventions.

The report begins by analyzing Gaza’s pre-war urban condition and highlights five core issues:

- High population density and full urbanization: 87% of Gaza is urban, with densities reaching 50,000 people/km² in some camps.
- Land fragmentation and limited public space: Only 35% of land is available for use, due to the presence of nature reserves and restricted zones (including Israeli-imposed buffer zones).
- Poor infrastructure: Water outages, electricity shortages, and the absence of modern communication networks all constrain recovery capacity.
- Geographical and political isolation: The occupation and the closure regime have rendered Gaza physically and politically separated from the West Bank and the outside world.
- Environmental stress: Water scarcity, groundwater pollution, ecosystem fragility, and increasing flooding in some areas.

The plan adopts a neighborhood-based approach as the primary intervention unit, through which damage levels are assessed, needs are identified, and tailored response plans are developed for each area. Neighborhoods are proposed to be classified according to density, building typology, service availability, and degree of damage. An “Urban Neighborhood Atlas” is already in development, featuring an index of neighborhood functions (services, infrastructure, density).

The plan also proposes integrating UN-Habitat’s Sustainable Neighborhood Principles with the Palestinian context. These include: walkability-based planning, efficient land use, social inclusion, environmental efficiency, and economic diversity.

The report focuses on five key sectors:

- Housing: Support for self-reconstruction, legal assistance in housing, land, and property (HLP) rights, and standardization of urban development criteria.
- Land: Resolution of land tenure issues, registry updates, and development of a national housing policy.
- Infrastructure and services: Linking urban reconstruction with network development (water, electricity, roads, communications).
- Environment: Neighborhood-level environmental impact assessments, and incorporation of “green reconstruction” planning from early stages.
- Legal framework: Development of compensation systems, institutional re-empowerment of local authorities, and promotion of democratic planning.

The implementation process is divided into three phases:

- Post-ceasefire phase (0–3 months): Transitional shelters, emergency assistance, damage assessments, and debris removal.
- Short to medium term (3–6 months): Mapping, legal support, and preliminary urban planning.
- Long term (over 6 months): Full-scale reconstruction, institutional reforms, and implementation of sustainable infrastructure projects.

The plan requires coordination among the Palestinian Authority, the United Nations, municipalities, donors, and both local and international private sectors.

It also acknowledges the existence of structural challenges that make planning dependent on “shifting scenarios,” including:

- The absence of a permanent ceasefire.
- The continued blockade and Israeli control over border crossings.
- The lack of accurate field data.
- Limited access to equipment and materials.

The plan further notes that certain scenarios (such as prolonged conflict or lack of return facilitation) could result in displaced populations remaining in temporary conditions for years—complicating planning efforts and deepening spatial and social fragmentation.

Critical Reading of the Plan

The UN-Habitat plan presents itself as a technical document—comprehensive in its vocabulary, humanitarian in its tone—yet behind this professional construction lies what may be called a “reconfiguration of political control through urban tools.” The neighborhood, framed as the basic unit of intervention, is not merely a service-delivery zone; rather, it becomes a field where the relationship between state, society, and space is restructured.

While the plan claims alignment with Palestinian national policies, it in fact reproduces a well-known model of international intervention that has persisted since post-2009 Gaza: a functional roadmap built on standards, phased implementation, and multilateral partnerships. However, it reduces the Palestinian role to one of technical coordination rather than sovereign planning or leadership. As with the World Bank’s IRDNA plan, planning discourse is used to neutralize political complexity and translate it into measurable administrative tasks—a technique that illustrates how urban planning can serve political pacification rather than liberation.

The discourse on “sustainable neighborhoods,” “green building,” and “urban recovery indicators,” while appealing on the surface, is not situated within a critical analysis of the siege, occupation, or forced displacement. Instead, it treats Gaza’s destruction as if caused by a natural disaster or internal disorder. This structural omission recasts Gaza not as an occupied territory but as a chaotic space that must be “organized,” “managed,” and “tamed” over time.

Despite repeated references to “Palestinian ownership,” the plan does not clarify how decisions are made from the bottom up, nor how the “right to the city” is operationalized into actionable tools. On the contrary, local actors—municipalities, civil society, grassroots committees—are repositioned as recipients of planning techniques rather than as producers of an alternative urban imagination.

In this context, “community participation” becomes a technical mechanism designed to ensure project efficiency, not a political practice enabling residents to challenge imposed trajectories. Participation becomes a tool for data collection and improved distribution—not a process for rethinking who plans, why, and for whom.

The plan’s references to post-conflict experiences in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon raise concern rather than confidence. In those cases, “neoliberal reconstruction” (Medani, 2004) models prevailed—driven by privatization, depoliticization, and the erasure of urban memory. These experiences often produced fragmented and crisis-ridden cities rather than rebuilt societies.

Lastly, framing the environment as an asset to be preserved (e.g., by preventing urban expansion into fragile lands) without addressing the deliberate environmental aggression perpetrated by Israel normalizes the consequences of these crimes. It turns the environment into a tool of urban control rather than one of resistance or reclamation of rights.

In short, the UN-Habitat plan appears to be a blueprint for reorganizing urban space—but at its core, it is a plan for reengineering the relationship between residents, the state, and donors, under a logic of gradualism rather than liberation. It redefines the neighborhood as a site for humanitarian intervention, not sovereignty, and transforms planning from a tool of emancipation into a structure of control—soft, environmental, institutional—but politically far from innocent.

1.6 Palestinian National Spatial Planning Strategy (PNA)

The Palestinian National Spatial Planning (PNA) strategy represents a serious and comprehensive attempt to reshape Palestinian geography as a tool for state-building and sovereignty assertion—amid ongoing occupation and deep institutional and territorial fragmentation. Developed by the National Urban Planning Agency in coordination with relevant state institutions, the plan presents an integrated vision that seeks to connect the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem within a single spatial framework. Its aim is to strengthen national unity and sustainable development while resisting the fragmentation imposed by Israeli colonial policies.

The plan is built around four interrelated strategic objectives:

- **Enhancing national sovereignty and geographic unity:** By reintegrating Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem within a unified spatial vision that challenges the geographic and political separation imposed by occupation.
- **Sustainability and resilience:** Through the adoption of sustainable development models that promote optimal resource use, green growth, and a circular economy—particularly in the energy, water, and infrastructure sectors.
- **Participatory planning and local leadership:** By adopting a comprehensive approach that

ensures the participation of local communities, the private sector, and civil society in shaping spatial policies.

- Regional connectivity and integration: The plan envisions Palestine as part of a broader Levantine mega-region, aiming to overcome isolation through enhanced internal infrastructure and regional linkages.
- The plan openly acknowledges one of its greatest challenges: Israel's control over nearly 60% of the West Bank (Area C), alongside settlement expansion, the separation wall, and the military checkpoint regime. In this context, the plan seeks to:
- Strategically utilize available land: By developing areas classified as "A" and "B" and border zones, despite imposed constraints.
- Plan for geographic reconnection: Through corridor projects such as a land link between Gaza and the West Bank and internal transport routes to reduce isolation.
- Expand local institutional capacities: Enabling them to withstand creeping displacement policies and building restrictions.
- The plan identifies several key sectoral priorities:
- Urban centers: Strengthening Palestinian cities as drivers of economic and administrative growth, while promoting digital connectivity and renewable energy.
- Agricultural and rural areas: Preserving farmland as a pillar of food security and rural development.
- Environmental and cultural sites: Protecting environmental and architectural heritage from degradation, and repurposing it as a tool for community development.
- Vital corridors: Developing internal and cross-border transportation and trade networks to connect Palestinian areas and facilitate regional outreach.
- The plan aims to build governance institutions capable of leading spatial development through:
- Land governance reform: Including land registry consolidation, securing property rights, and preventing forced displacement.
- Infrastructure rehabilitation: In energy, water, transportation, and telecommunications, with a focus on solar energy and waste recycling.
- Community-based housing programs: Targeting affected families, reflecting Palestinian identity, and designed through participatory planning.
- Environmental sustainability: By reducing pollution, protecting resources, and integrating green solutions into reconstruction efforts.
- The plan is driven by centralized leadership under the Palestinian government, but implemented through a multi-level participatory model:
- Sovereign ministries (Planning, Local Governance, Economy, Environment, etc.): For sectoral policymaking and execution.
- Private sector: As a partner in financing and implementation within a new legislative framework for Public-Private Partnerships (PPP).
- Civil society and local communities: To ensure participatory development and geographic and social equity.
- National coordination mechanisms: To prevent duplication and maximize efficiency through cooperation among national, local, and international institutions.

The geographic linkage between Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem is treated as a strategic priority:

- Gaza Strip: To be reconnected via road and infrastructure projects, and reintegrated into national development plans.
- East Jerusalem: Addressed as an integral part of the national fabric, with a clear rejection of isolation or Judaization through spatial tools.
- Timeline, Implementation Tools, and Risk Management:
- Phased timelines: Including immediate responses followed by medium- and long-term development stages, with built-in flexibility to adapt to political developments.
- Planning tools: Encompass new land laws, regulatory procedures, and digital investments for smart governance.
- Risks: Include Israeli restrictions, funding volatility, political division, and security instability—mitigated through “adaptive management” and flexible planning diplomacy.

Critical Reading of the Plan

The National Spatial Planning Strategy (PNA) is presented as an inherently sovereign project—an attempt to reshape Palestinian geography through the lens of statehood. It aspires to resist the fragmentation imposed by occupation through planning and development, rather than direct confrontation. Yet, despite its noble goals, the plan collides with a host of structural challenges and overly optimistic assumptions, warranting a closer reading of what it states, what it maps on paper, and what it collides with in reality.

The plan treats sovereignty as a technical-institutional endeavor: it draws boundaries, plans infrastructure, and envisions network systems. But in the absence of actual control over more than 60% of the West Bank (Area C), and under Israeli dominance over resources and crossings, sovereignty becomes little more than a cartographic fiction. While the text promises a unified spatial vision connecting Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, the on-the-ground reality reproduces separation—rendering any integrated map more symbolic than executable. The plan raises a fundamental question without answering it: Can a state be planned when its tools are not possessed? And can planning alone overcome the coercive geography engineered by occupation?

The strategy bets on tools of planning and development—renewable energy, circular economy, institutional decentralization—as though Palestine were a post-conflict zone, seemingly ignoring the fact that it remains under active colonial domination. The issue is not a lack of technical capacity, but rather an abundance of structural constraints: movement restrictions, border control, Jerusalem’s isolation, and land confiscation. Although the plan acknowledges these constraints, it treats them as “challenges” to be resolved through “negotiation” or “adaptive governance,” overlooking the fact that occupation itself preconditions the failure of any meaningful sovereign project.

The plan offers a participatory governance model involving ministries, municipalities, civil society, and the private sector—appearing exemplary on paper. Yet in the absence of a unified execution framework—especially given the Gaza–West Bank split—this participatory logic risks becoming a mask for the absence of centralized decision-making. The plan assigns broad roles to the private sector, yet fails to interrogate

existing power relations within the Palestinian economy or provide safeguards against spatial exclusion of marginalized classes or rural areas that may result from urban-centered investments.

Despite repeated references to Gaza and Jerusalem, the plan does not delve into the urban planning specifics of either. It avoids confronting the Israeli policies that physically isolate Jerusalem or block geographic continuity between Gaza and the West Bank. The notion of “linking Gaza to the West Bank” is framed as a technical option—when in fact it is a matter of core sovereignty struggle.

The plan seems to rely on what could be called “wishful planning”: expanding roads, developing crossings, connecting areas, without enforcement tools or even political levers to challenge those who actively prevent such actions.

Although the plan speaks of participatory governance, its approach remains largely centralized: led by ministries, executed by formal institutions, with communities involved only as needed. There is no genuine vision to redefine the citizen-place relationship, where people are co-creators, not just beneficiaries. Nor are there mechanisms to redistribute spatial power, making community participation and accountability consultative rather than transformative.

In short, the NSP is a bold project in its ambition, clear in its language, and rooted in a sovereignty-and-development narrative. Yet it remains constrained by the logic of a state without the instruments of statehood, and by planning tools that fail to confront the daily dismemberment of Palestinian geography. It can be seen as an effort to tidy up a besieged house, applying rational order in the face of a colonial system that legalizes chaos. Its success may lie not in the precision of its maps, but in its ability to turn planning into a tool of political, societal, and regional engagement, rather than a bureaucratic, technocratic exercise with authoritarian undertones.

1.7 Arab Plan for the Reconstruction of Gaza

The Joint Arab Plan for the Reconstruction of Gaza, led by Egypt and Qatar in coordination with the Palestinian Authority, presents a coherent phased vision that integrates emergency relief, reconstruction, the restoration of governance, and the preparation for Palestinian political unity. The plan starts from an acknowledgment of the post-war complexities in Gaza, yet it aims to re-establish a consensual administrative system that leads to the gradual normalization of life and the rebuilding of legitimate institutions, without engaging directly in the details of Palestinian internal division or the political settlement terms with the occupation.

The plan is grounded in the political reference framework of the “two-state solution,” the Palestinian right to self-determination, and the rejection of displacement or resettlement. It treats Gaza as an integral part of the Palestinian state and seeks to reinforce this notion through reconstruction tools, the institutionalization of transitional governance, and the empowerment of the Palestinian Authority as the legitimate representative.

It combines urgent humanitarian dimensions (ending the current catastrophe) with a long-term structural approach that requires the rehabilitation of Gaza on urban, institutional, and security levels within a sovereign national—not factional—framework.

The plan proposes a three-phase approach:

1. First Phase – Transitional Administration (up to 6 months):

- Establishment of a temporary “Gaza Administration Committee” composed of non-partisan technocratic figures operating under the supervision of the Palestinian Authority. Their role is to manage public affairs, coordinate relief efforts, and liaise with international actors until the gradual restoration of official PA institutions.

2. Second Phase – Restoration of PA Institutions:

- Gradual transfer of administrative responsibility to the Palestinian Authority, accompanied by reforms in security and service institutions, with Egyptian-Jordanian training support.
- Reactivation of ministries and local councils under a unified administrative model.

3. Third Phase – Restoring Legitimacy and Elections:

- Promotion of good governance and development of a sustainable institutional framework.
- Preparation for general Palestinian elections as a pathway to end division and restore national legitimacy.

The plan relies on clear institutional tools, including:

- Gaza Administration Committee: a transitional operational body playing a critical role in filling the administrative vacuum.
- Strengthening the role of the Palestinian Authority as the legitimate sovereign entity, especially in managing crossings, security, and public service institutions.
- Partnership with Egypt and Qatar: providing logistical, security, and financial support—particularly in security training and infrastructure rehabilitation.
- Activation of an international coordination framework: bringing together donors, UN organizations, and the private sector to ensure resource governance and transparency.

The plan adopts a functional urban division of Gaza into five zones (logistics, culture, knowledge, governance, peace), so that reconstruction serves a long-term developmental goal. It moves beyond technical visions to reproduce the urban space as a tool for economic and social stability. The reconstruction strategy is based on scientific damage assessments, with priority given to infrastructure, health and education services, and the housing sector—particularly in areas affected by mass displacement.

Through joint Egyptian-Jordanian oversight of the training of Palestinian security forces, the plan seeks to:

- Rebuild PA-affiliated security forces under a non-partisan professional model.
- Enable Palestinian control over crossings, with bilateral coordination with Egypt and Israel to regulate movement and prevent smuggling or escalation.

- Protect Palestinian sovereignty by ensuring that security and services are tools in the hands of national institutions, not external or factional actors.

The plan affirms that all pathways must be led by Palestinians, yet it recognizes the fragility of the political environment. Therefore, it proposes a non-factional transitional committee to avoid conflict, alongside preparations for a broader national dialogue. It also emphasizes:

- The role of local communities and the empowerment of women and youth in planning and implementation.
- The need to reduce political fragmentation by rebuilding the administrative system on professional foundations, away from factional quotas.

Challenges and Underlying Assumptions:

Despite the rationality of its structure, the plan is built on a set of uncertain assumptions, including:

- The acceptance of the plan and transitional committee by all Palestinian parties.
- Israeli openness to arrangements related to crossings and security.
- The sustainability of Arab and international funding.
- The Palestinian Authority's ability to remain cohesive and effectively implement the plan.

Critical Reading of the Plan

The Arab Reconstruction Plan for Gaza presents itself as a rational response to post-war chaos. However, when deconstructed, it reveals itself as a political framework aiming to restructure the Palestinian field through a regional-security architecture that goes beyond emergency relief and intersects with conceptions of governance, agency legitimacy, and geopolitical control. The plan does not merely seek to rebuild Gaza—it redefines who holds the right to organize space and power within it, under what could be described as a model of *conditional recovery*: a recovery that begins not with rebuilding homes, but with reproducing political hierarchies through soft tools.

The establishment of a non-factional technocratic committee is not a political solution, but rather a form of whitewashing the absence of national decision-making. It effectively institutionalizes the “vacuum” instead of filling it, stripping Gaza of representative agency and reducing it to an administrative file managed by regional actors. This does not lay the foundation for national consensus, but rather entrenches a logic of “technical guardianship” (Mouffe, 2018) under the umbrella of legitimacy. What appears to be neutral consensus is, in essence, a reduction of popular agency and a re-centralization of power outside the Palestinian context—where the imposed solution becomes more important than the discussion around it.

What the plan refers to as the “early recovery phase” is, in reality, an intensely political founding moment operating under the label of “stability.” In this phase, sovereign functions (security, administration, protection, representation) are reconfigured according to a formula that excludes politics and legitimizes procedural paths. Recovery here is not used as a gateway to build a democratic system, but rather as a tool to domesticate the political space through a carefully

staged administrative sequence—one that bypasses elections and instead engineers governance from the outside in.

The plan speaks of restoring the Palestinian Authority, but does not grant it actual sovereign tools. Instead, it positions the PA as an executor of a pre-engineered regional-international vision. There is no mechanism for renegotiating the PA's role, nor any accountability for its institutional weaknesses or representational failures. Thus, the Authority is reintroduced not as a solution, but as an implementing agent for a security-development package that assumes governance can be imposed without internal dialogue, social accountability, or even consensus on the legitimacy of its return.

A striking paradox is that the plan reorders the Gaza Strip—security-wise, administratively, and in terms of service provision—without any practical framing of the occupation's role in this equation. Borders are managed, security is rebuilt, crossings are coordinated—but the occupation is never named as the dominant and obstructive actor. This systematic omission or assimilation of colonial power renders the plan a “neo-occupation” (Byrne, 2010) project—one that operates as if post-occupation conditions exist, when in fact Israeli control remains the material root of Gaza's crises, from infrastructure to sovereignty.

The plan carries within it a tendency toward “over-spatialization” (Fehren, 2011): Gaza is divided into functional zones and reorganized according to technical criteria, as if the crisis begins with the redistribution of space, not the redefinition of power, sovereignty, and representation. In this logic, reconstruction becomes a form of spatial-population regulation that conceals power asymmetries behind the façade of infrastructure. It resembles a “spatialized peace,” (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017) rather than a political one.

In short, the Arab plan is not merely a vision for Gaza's relief or infrastructure repair. It is a framework that redefines who plans, who implements, and who represents Palestinians—through a soft political-security reconstruction model wrapped in technocratic language. It is a project to reengineer the Palestinian political field during a moment of vacuum, while keeping the colonial actor outside the frame. It presumes that institutional engineering can produce legitimacy without resistance, accountability, or true representation.

1.8 Gaza Phoenix Plan

The “Gaza Phoenix” plan stands out as one of the most coherent frameworks in terms of political and spatial vision. It moves beyond traditional relief approaches or short-term utilitarian solutions to offer a rooted, critical, and distinctly Palestinian alternative. The plan is based on an integrated reconstruction paradigm centered on spatial justice, social sovereignty, and environmental sustainability. Unlike most externally imposed frameworks, Gaza Phoenix places Palestinian and community agency at the core of the process, demonstrating clear sensitivity toward Gaza's urban and cultural identity and the imperative to preserve rather than erase it in the name of reconstruction.

The plan emphasizes local revival, aiming to rebuild Gaza from within its own social and geographic fabric rather than impose ready-made blueprints from outside. Notably, it explicitly rejects the “tabula rasa” (blank slate) approach, which assumes reconstruction must start from zero—as if

the place has no history or context. In contrast, Gaza Phoenix views Gaza's social and urban fabric as one of its pillars of resilience, not a burden to be erased, and works to protect and reactivate it.

Importantly, the plan does not separate emergency from planning but establishes a methodology rooted in the overlap between rapid response and strategic vision. This makes the plan feasible under volatile conditions—without sacrificing long-term goals.

The reconstruction process is divided into three interconnected phases:

- Short-term (Emergency Phase): Focuses on protecting remaining infrastructure, conducting detailed damage assessments, and ensuring urgent humanitarian response.
- Medium-term (Stabilization and Repair): Deals with the restoration of critical services and infrastructure, reactivation of local institutions, and building a solid base for the next phase.
- Long-term (Reconstruction and Development): Involves comprehensive urban design, legal and regulatory reforms, and reconfiguring infrastructure and service networks based on principles of environmental and social justice.

What distinguishes these phases is that they are not merely sequential steps, but part of an integrated multi-scalar system (from regional to neighborhood level), with each phase planned in view of what precedes and follows it.

The plan covers a range of intersecting sectors implemented in an integrated manner:

- Housing and Infrastructure: Developing culturally and environmentally resilient housing models based on circular construction hubs that reuse demolition materials and preserve neighborhood character and identity.
- Governance and Social Cohesion: Strengthening local governance and community participation while promoting polycentric urbanism that respects geographic and social diversity.
- Economic Revitalization: Supporting the local economy through recycling, small-scale enterprises, and fostering sustainable self-sufficiency in productive sectors.
- Public Services and Environment: Developing water and sanitation networks, integrated waste management systems, and embedding green infrastructure that supports biodiversity.
- Mobility and Urban Connectivity: Establishing flexible, sustainable transportation networks that ensure effective connectivity and equitable access to resources.

At the heart of the plan is genuine community participation at every stage of design and implementation. The plan was developed through community meetings and workshops involving families, municipalities, experts, and students (such as those from Birzeit University), treating local knowledge as a core partner rather than a symbolic gesture. This stands as one of the most practical and policy-oriented expressions of accountability and participatory governance.

The plan adopts transparent, democratic mechanisms such as memoranda of understanding, multi-level governance models, and role distribution among local, national, and international actors. It relies on a flexible, multi-layered institutional structure that includes:

- Municipalities and national institutions as leaders and coordinators.
- Grassroots organizations and civil society as channels for representation and accountability.
- Universities as data centers and sources of knowledge and analysis.
- International partners as technical collaborators—not overseers.

Implementation is managed through project management tools, clear timelines, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms grounded in transparency.

The plan acknowledges several complex challenges, including:

- Political and security constraints—particularly related to border and crossing control and the obstruction of materials and equipment by the occupation.
- Logistical constraints—stemming from infrastructure destruction and access difficulties.
- Funding uncertainty—due to international donor fatigue and geopolitical fluctuations.
- Risks of displacement and land confiscation—with a warning that reconstruction must not be exploited as a pretext for forced demographic or spatial change.

The spatial vision of the plan is based on:

- Polycentric urbanism—to avoid centralization and ensure spatial equity.
- Environmental-social integration—through resource reuse, transition to a circular economy, and climate-friendly design.
- Preserving identity—by respecting collective memory and the cultural landscape of cities and neighborhoods.
- Multi-scalar planning—from the regional to the granular level, ensuring coherence and adaptability.

Critical Reading of the Plan

The Gaza Phoenix plan stands out as one of the few frameworks that not only aim to rebuild what was destroyed by aggression but also seek to redraw the relationship between space, people, and sovereignty. It overturns the logic of emergency as a vehicle for international intervention and affirms that “reconstruction” is not merely an engineering activity but a political and strategic project to restore full life—anchored in identity, justice, and dignity.

In contrast to donor-driven plans that promote the idea of “neutral reconstruction,” Phoenix explicitly positions itself as a deeply political plan—though not partisan or authoritarian. It practices politics from within the community, from the very ground that was bombed, from the neighborhoods that endured—not from donor coordination offices.

In doing so, the plan redefines Gaza’s role—from a passive recipient to an active producer of planning policy and urban discourse. Put more directly, it withdraws legitimacy from externally imposed plans and returns it to the people. This is the essence of accountability and participatory governance. Many international frameworks are built on the notion that “pre-war systems failed and were unworthy,” and therefore reconstruction must start from scratch. While this may appear

pragmatic, it often reflects a soft colonial tendency—to erase what exists and impose an external vision, frequently at the expense of vulnerable communities.

Phoenix fundamentally rejects this logic, insisting that what was built under siege and poverty must not be erased in the name of modernity. It is a call to preserve the fabric, not dismantle it—to plan with people, not above them.

What is particularly remarkable is that the plan does not view destruction as a blank canvas to be exploited but as a memory to be negotiated. The use of rubble in the creation of circular construction hubs is not only an environmental measure but also a deeply symbolic act: homes that were bombed become the material for new homes. It is a life/death/life cycle reclaimed from the ashes. In this way, planning is not used to whitewash destruction, but to transform it into local, resistant rebirth.

Despite the strength of this approach, the plan does not conceal its fragility in the face of a complex political landscape. Its emphasis on localism may be met with resistance from major donors who prefer utilitarian models. Moreover, the absence of a unified Palestinian implementation authority poses a real threat to the plan's feasibility.

While decentralization enhances justice, it may weaken national-level political negotiation if not coupled with a unified Palestinian stance. In its attempt to move beyond centralized power or international trusteeship, the plan may have gone too far in marginalizing the role of the Palestinian Authority or relevant ministries. While this is understandable as a means to protect local character, it also risks further institutional fragmentation unless it is grounded in broad national coordination. In short, Gaza Phoenix is less a reconstruction plan than a resistant urban manifesto. It frames planning as an act of liberation and redefines the Palestinian's relationship with land, time, and place as a mirror of dignity and sovereignty. While other plans reproduce the logic of “donor/implementer/beneficiary,” Phoenix rearranges the equation: the implementer is the community, the beneficiary is history, and the donor must adapt—or withdraw. But for the plan to move from theoretical text to lived reality, it requires political protection, institutional recognition, and a broad social alliance to shield it from international co-optation or local distortion.

1.9 Trump–Pelzman Plan: “Gaza Riviera”

The “Economic Plan for the Reconstruction of Gaza: A Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Approach, widely known to have inspired the “Gaza Riviera Plan” or the “Trump Plan,” is one of the most ambitious and controversial proposals presented in the context of the “day after” Gaza war. The plan was developed by Professor Joseph Pelzman of George Washington University and Director of CEES-MENA Inc. It appears to form the technical basis for the extreme Trump proposal for the USA to “own” and rebuild the Strip, after removing its population (though the ethnic cleansing idea was not in the plan document, and was reportedly added by Jared Kushner who first coined the Riviera concept). It proposes a 50-year BOT model, rooted in a purely capitalist investment logic that treats Gaza as an open experimental space for economic restructuring through market tools—entirely detached from political or sovereign tracks. On the contrary, it actively deconstructs the political dimension of reconstruction, reframing it as service management.

The plan begins with a highly appealing marketing vision that emphasizes opportunity and development, promising to transform Gaza from a devastated area into a global investment destination through a series of mega-projects described as “erasure and comprehensive rebuilding.” These include infrastructure, economic systems, governance models, and even urban culture. The term “Gaza Riviera” stems from its vision of converting Gaza’s coastal front into something resembling a European Riviera through luxury tourism projects.

Vision and Objectives

- **Central Vision:** Transform Gaza into a green, demilitarized, and self-sufficient economy based on an advanced, transparent market model, while deferring political sovereignty until after the operational period ends.
- **Political Objectives:** Establish the “rule of law” based on the Anglo-Saxon Common Law system, encompassing property rights, contracts, criminal law, and compensation mechanisms.
- **Economic Objectives:** Develop a triple-sector economy focusing on tourism, agriculture, and technology, aiming to achieve food security by reviving local agriculture.
- **Spatial Objectives:** Construct high-density residential complexes modeled after “Chinese housing towers,” with modern infrastructure such as light rail, green ports and airports, and the elimination of private vehicles in favor of advanced public transport.

Execution and Governance Model

- **Implementing Entities:** International and regional investors become equity partners in Gaza’s economy for 50 years and handle civil management through subcontracted firms.
- **Civil Administration:** Managed by private entities chosen by the investors, based on the principle of “the private sector delivers public services.”
- **Governance Mechanisms:** A full-fledged e-Government system with a legal and economic environment conducive to investment.
- **Financing Model:** Investment is the primary funding source. Investing states own shares in public assets. The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is used to guide economic policy.

Three Phases of Implementation

- **Foundational Phase (0–3 years):** Rubble removal, establishment of core infrastructure, legal and commercial environment setup, and creation of the operating authority.
- **Operational Phase (4–15 years):** Launch of major economic projects, enforcement of new governance frameworks, and beginning of capital return for investors.
- **Transfer Phase (after 50 years):** Assets and infrastructure are to be handed over to a Palestinian entity—conditional on meeting vague and externally assessed criteria of “efficiency and transparency.”

Position of Palestinians in the Plan

- **Political Status:** Palestinians are viewed as residents, not citizens, with sovereignty deferred until the contract ends.

- **Expected Roles:** Palestinians would benefit from updated education and job opportunities in the three main sectors, in addition to enhanced freedom of movement.
- **Local Administration:** Virtually absent, with governance delegated to foreign entities, and no role assigned to the Palestinian Authority or other Palestinian political actors.

Security and Political Assumptions

- **Assumed Context:** Post-war Gaza, following the defeat or neutralization of Hamas and the absence of armed resistance.
- **Security Setup:** Assumes a demilitarized Gaza, with no specific security arrangements mentioned, and relies implicitly on Israeli and regional acceptance of the model.
- **Regional Cooperation:** Draws on educational and administrative models from Gulf countries (UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia) as templates for modernization and institutional reform.

Narrative and Language of the Plan

- **Core Narrative:** Gaza's economic failure is due to a lack of modern management, which can be solved through investment and law enforcement—a narrative that bypasses political dimensions.
- **Discourse Frame:** Technocratic, economic, and politically non-confrontational; promotes market-based solutions while masking explicit political agendas.

According to the plan, the cost of rebuilding Gaza would range between \$1–2 trillion USD, with an implementation timeline of 5 to 10 years. It includes the construction of an airport, seaport, power station, desalination plant, and the development of tourism, agriculture, and high-tech sectors. Investors would receive usufruct rights for 50 years.

In short, the plan exemplifies “disaster capitalism”—leveraging collapse as an opportunity to restructure politics and the economy according to standards that do not serve the local population. Instead, it redirects Gaza into global market networks and redefines Palestinians as minor investors in their own homeland. It proposes reconstruction without reclaiming the cause, development without liberation—making it seductive in appearance but politically hazardous in content. It calls for serious political scrutiny before any adoption or implementation.

Notably, the plan treats Gaza as a separate case, disconnected from the West Bank and the broader Palestinian national project.

Critical Reading of the Plan

At first glance, the Trump–Pelzman Plan appears ambitious and alluring—articulated in a glossy language promising unprecedented opportunities, a transformative leap forward, and the deployment of smart technologies and economies in the reconstruction process. However, a closer reading of its narrative structure and institutional content reveals deep-rooted neoliberal biases at its core, alongside a quiet political engineering project that replaces Gaza's political and social struggle with the logic of the market. The plan erases the occupation and reduces Palestinians to “efficient users” or “silent investors” in a project over which they have no control.

The plan doesn't merely marginalize the political dimension—it strips it entirely from the reconstruction agenda, redefining Gaza not as a territory in need of liberation or decolonization, but as a site requiring “good management.” Thus, reconstruction is reframed not as a sovereign act but as a commercial service, managed through digital governance tools and commercial contracts—treating the rebuilding of an occupied land as if it could occur independently of freedom, dignity, or justice.

This plan exemplifies what is widely known as disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007), where the moment of collapse and extreme humanitarian need is leveraged as a market entry point for capital, enabling the restructuring of the economy around profit and the creation of “emerging markets” atop the ruins of a devastated society. It transforms crisis from a political tragedy into an investment opportunity, and Gaza from a space of resistance into an experimental playground for market-based policies.

The proposal to establish an investment entity with operational control over the Gaza Strip for 50 years, under a foreign legal framework, essentially strips Palestinians of any legal or regulatory sovereignty over their land. Instead of being treated as citizens with rights, Palestinians are recast as “beneficiaries” or “clients,” expected to conform to the proposed infrastructure and prove their efficiency and discipline to ensure continued inclusion. In doing so, the plan empties the relationship between people and land of its historical and political substance, reducing it to a service-based transaction subject to external evaluation and potential cancellation.

The plan promotes luxury coastal developments, special economic zones, resorts, and yacht marinas—all designed to attract foreign or elite Palestinian capital. However, it fails to address how it will deal with refugees, camps, or destroyed neighborhoods. It offers no vision for reintegrating marginalized or displaced communities into the new economic fabric. Instead, it presents a blueprint for producing a deeply classed city, where the poor are pushed aside, and neighborhoods are redefined based on investment attractiveness.

Implementation is conditioned on security and administrative coordination with Israel, including movement arrangements via crossings managed in cooperation with the occupying power. The plan proposes no vision for lifting the blockade or securing Palestinian control over borders. Rather, it adapts to the current status quo, treating it as a neutral fact rather than an unjust condition to be challenged. This amounts to a structural normalization of the occupation, stripping the Palestinian cause of its liberatory essence.

In short, this is a reconstruction vision without memory, development without sovereignty, and modernity without freedom. It constitutes a structural extension of the logic of neo-colonialism, only this time dressed in a polished investment suit.

1.10 Al Habtoor (UAE) Plan

The plan developed by the Al Habtoor Research Center in the United Arab Emirates presents a comprehensive vision for Gaza's reconstruction, going beyond traditional relief frameworks to propose a reconfiguration of the economic sphere and governance structures through a developmental-investment approach with a regional character. The initiative seeks to gradually

disengage Gaza from economic dependency on Israel and horizontally integrate it into Arab economic networks, driven by Gulf capital and implemented through private sector-led mechanisms and strategic alliances.

The initiative's vision revolves around achieving a structural transformation of Gaza—from a state of chronic fragility to a flexible and sustainable economic-civil model—through three interlinked tracks:

- Gradual economic independence from Israel, by establishing local productive sectors in energy, water, infrastructure, and manufacturing.
- Effective governance based on transparency and accountability, led by gradually empowered Palestinian institutions, framed by anti-corruption laws and civil oversight of the security sector.
- Arab regional integration, through trade agreements with Egypt and Jordan to enable exports and imports, breaking the logic of geographical and economic isolation.

The plan is presented as a strategic alternative to what it calls “cycles of repeated failure,” relying on Arab investments led by sovereign or semi-sovereign companies and institutions, under both international and local technocratic supervision.

The initiative adopts an advanced spatial planning vision based on a “smart reconstruction” model, including:

- Temporary and sustainable housing: Prefabricated housing units built from war rubble and assembled rapidly in the south of Gaza, providing environmentally sensitive temporary shelter while creating local job opportunities.
- Specialized industrial zones: Targeting the production of essential goods, renewable energy, and select manufacturing sectors, located in pre-planned areas to reduce land disputes and ensure urban-economic integration.
- Gradual infrastructure development: Including road networks, solar energy stations, water desalination plants, and smart sewage systems, to be implemented in three phases over 18–60 months, ranging from urgent repairs to structural solutions.

The governance framework of the plan is based on a three-stage structure:

1. Preparatory phase: Establishing civil local councils, anti-corruption mechanisms, and transparency systems.
2. Capacity-building phase: Training staff, reforming the judiciary, and activating financial oversight and administrative auditing.
3. Transfer of authority phase: Gradual handover of project management to Palestinian institutions, conditional upon institutional readiness.

While the initiative emphasizes the “Palestinian” nature of governance, it constrains this transition with a set of prerequisites, keeping decision-making in the hands of international and Arab partners during the initial stages.

The plan also includes the formation of a regionally led investment holding company, with 70% ownership by Palestinian and Arab investors (including sovereign funds and diaspora), and 30% by foreign investors. This company will serve as a financing and implementation vehicle, managing investments in infrastructure, energy, industry, and financial services.

Implementation mechanisms rely on:

- Public-private partnerships (PPPs).
- A clear timeline, beginning with relief, then smart construction, and finally institutional transformation.
- Administrative technology, including digital tracking systems, performance indicators, and digital transparency tools.

The plan stresses the importance of “Palestinian leadership” in implementation, symbolized by locating the company’s headquarters in Rafah and calling for the empowerment of national institutions. However, this role is simultaneously constrained by discourse around “institutional maturity” and “readiness,” making sovereignty conditional and its transfer delayed within the logic of a “prolonged transition.”

Despite its operational depth, the plan faces several key issues:

- Deliberate omission of the occupation: The plan does not address the Israeli blockade or the problem of border crossings, keeping these critical matters outside the narrative—as if the core issue were a lack of development rather than a lack of freedom.
- Depoliticization (Ferguson, 1994):: Reconstruction is presented as a tool for stability without addressing the root political causes of the crisis, thereby reproducing the same logic of “rebuilding instead of liberation.”
- Private sector dominance: The plan promotes a corporate-owned economy that could marginalize local actors and civil society, reduce the public interest and services to privatized income generators, reconfiguring Gaza more as a special economic zone than a national-political entity.
- Horizontal vision without national depth: While the plan reintegrates Gaza into the Arab market, it does not necessarily reintegrate it into the Palestinian political body, leaving national unity postponed.

It is also worth noting that the plan includes the deployment of international monitors and peacekeeping forces. These teams will be stationed at key checkpoints and construction sites to monitor the movement of individuals and materials, ensuring that dual-use materials are not diverted for military purposes. They will be equipped with communication tools and real-time reporting systems to flag any violations or potential threats, in order to ensure the safety of reconstruction operations.

Critical Reading of the Plan

At first glance, the Al Habtoor Plan for the Reconstruction of Gaza appears to be one of the most meticulously designed plans in terms of engineering details, timelines, and financial partnerships. However, at its core, it reproduces a developmental model stripped of politics and charged with

a neoliberal-regional vision aimed at the flexible control of the Gaza Strip. This means the plan does not emerge from a context of resistance or colonial accountability, but rather from a moment of collapse in which disaster is transformed into an investment opportunity, and rubble becomes a marketable construction resource.

What distinguishes the initiative most is its dismantling of the state as a sovereign economic actor, replacing it with a “Palestinian–Arab–International” holding company—a supra-political structure that transcends the state and reconfigures the economy as a domain for capital flows, not as an expression of a liberation project. In this model, Gaza becomes more of an “investment zone” than a political arena, where decision-making is reshaped through tools of financing, planning, and reporting—not through political representation or community dialogue.

Despite all the references to “Palestinian leadership” and “local ownership,” the plan frames sovereignty as a “reward” conditional on technical competence and administrative compliance. The Palestinian, in this plan, is not a full actor, but one whose sovereign maturity is staged according to performance indicators. This type of “deferred sovereignty” subjects political decision-making to the authority of metrics and international oversight, turning Gaza into a testing ground for the Palestinian capacity to “self-manage” before being granted the right to self-determination.

The initiative almost entirely ignores the Israeli colonial actor: there is no reference to border crossings, the blockade, Israel’s role in obstructing reconstruction, or the tools of remote control. As such, the plan produces a condition of reconstruction without context, development without conflict, and governance without colonialism. This omission does not simply reflect absence but reveals an ideological intent to depoliticize reconstruction and replace it with terms like “innovation,” “investment,” and “entrepreneurship,” as if Gaza’s crisis stems from a lack of markets rather than the persistence of occupation.

The plan’s discourse on transparency, governance, and oversight—though legitimate at the administrative level—is used in this context as a tool to control politics under the guise of management. The plan organizes political space not through representation but through financial and technical evaluation. This opens the door to a model of economic discipline that legitimizes political exclusion, where there is no room for factions, national dialogue, or even civil society—only executive-investment networks deciding from above.

The initiative positions Gaza within a network of Arab commercial and investment relations (Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf), but without effectively linking it to the unity of the Palestinian national project. This suggests a reorientation of Gaza horizontally within Arab markets rather than vertically within the Palestinian political body, foreshadowing a reproduction of the “Gaza First” project—this time in an economic-developmental form, where the priority becomes the stabilization of financial flow networks, not the revival of a unified political vision.

In short, it is a plan to reconstruct the Strip, but not to rebuild the cause. And while the plan may seem appealing in its details, it carries within it a reproduction of domination through soft means—removing politics from reconstruction and confining the Palestinian to the role of a “good recipient,” who must prove competence before being granted the right to decide—and the right to self-determination.

1.11 The PREP Plan (Palestine Emerging)

The “Palestine Emerging” plan (commonly referred to as PREP) offers an advanced model for economic and spatial reconstruction in Palestine—particularly in the post-war context of Gaza. It presents itself as a comprehensive, long-term vision for rebuilding the state from a developmental-economic perspective, with a strong emphasis on integrated urban planning, participatory governance, and coordinated multilateral efforts. The plan moves beyond emergency rhetoric and fragmented aid streams to call for a strategic transformation that enables the Palestinian economy to integrate globally, while reconstructing Palestinian space as a unified and functionally connected whole—despite the immense political challenges on the ground.

The plan conceptualizes the Palestinian economy as a connected entity capable of managing its resources effectively and strengthening its position within the regional and global economy. This vision is articulated through several key pillars:

- **Spatial Vision:** Unifying the Palestinian urban landscape by connecting Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem under one national urban framework—avoiding the reproduction of fragmentation or temporary solutions.
- **Economic Vision:** Building a competitive economy based on productive, creative, and service sectors, and fostering connections between Palestinians inside and outside the homeland.
- **Integrated Planning:** The plan cautions against investing in short-term infrastructure (e.g., temporary housing camps) without strategic foresight, warning that such decisions may obscure long-term pathways.

The plan identifies several foundational sectors that must anchor reconstruction efforts:

- **Infrastructure:** Electricity, water, sanitation, and digital transformation.
- **Social Services:** Health, education, and housing.
- **Productive Sectors:** Industry, creative economy, tourism, and knowledge-based economy.
- **Soft Power:** Culture, heritage, and the arts as tools to strengthen identity and community resilience.

Implementation Mechanisms include:

- **Local Empowerment:** Through capacity-building and leadership initiatives, especially targeting youth and communities.
- **Multilateral Partnerships:** Among the state, civil society, private sector, and international actors.
- **Innovative Financing:** Utilizing non-traditional tools to fund infrastructure and service provision.
- **Institutional Coordination:** Via flexible governance structures that avoid duplication and disorder in project implementation.

The plan places particular focus on Gaza, as the epicenter of the humanitarian and field crisis, but it warns against treating Gaza merely as a “damaged zone.” Instead, it advocates for:

- Developing a long-term urban plan for Gaza before initiating temporary infrastructure projects.

- Functionally, politically, and economically integrating Gaza with the West Bank.
- Addressing urgent needs such as housing, waste management, and public facilities—but within a strategic framework that avoids repeating post-2014 reconstruction failures.

While the plan claims to be apolitical, it implicitly discounts the significance of the existence of a sovereign Palestinian state as a condition for development:

- It avoids engaging with the conditions of occupation or final status issues.
- It acknowledges Israeli control over land and crossings as a challenge, yet offers no institutional strategy to resist or dismantle that control.
- It adopts a classic neoliberal logic that economic success may accelerate political resolution—linking “stability” to growth rather than liberation.

The plan outlines a clear role distribution:

- Palestinian Authority: Coordination, planning, execution, and institutional building.
- Civil Society: Community mobilization, skills development, and local monitoring.
- Private Sector: Funding, implementation, innovation, and job creation.
- Donors: Funding, technical support, and priority alignment via a coordination mechanism.

The PREP plan is structured around a flexible, phased vision:

- Phase One – Stabilization and Early Recovery: Includes rubble removal, restoration of essential services, and humanitarian response.
- Phase Two – Strategic Planning: City design, transport network mapping, and designation of industrial zones.
- Phase Three – Implementation and Construction: Through development programs grounded in institutional governance and large-scale investment.

The plan strongly emphasizes avoiding short-term projects that may contradict long-term infrastructure goals or block strategic developmental pathways.

Critical Reading of the Plan

The Palestine Emerging (PREP) plan presents itself as a rational, well-studied, and forward-looking vision for rebuilding Palestine, supposedly informed by Palestinian business expert insights. However, beneath its technically polished surface lie politically biased assumptions that treat the occupation as a technical obstacle rather than a colonial structure. The plan reconfigures the national liberation project within neoliberal economic frameworks—development without liberation, and planning without accountability.

The plan rests on a central premise: that strengthening the Palestinian economy and connecting Gaza and the West Bank through networks of investment, infrastructure, and integrated governance could pave the way for a political solution or mitigate the effects of the occupation. This logic reproduces the illusion of “economic peace” promoted by various actors since the Oslo Accords—with no tangible outcomes other than reorganizing domination through developmental rhetoric.

Despite its ambition, the plan deliberately avoids engaging with structural colonial realities: there is no mention of border control, military occupation, or the blockade as a systematic tool. Instead, political paralysis is redefined as “planning flexibility,” and catastrophe is reframed as opportunity. When occupation is mentioned, it is treated as an “external challenge,” not as a system that internally undermines every sovereign vision of governance or development.

What is particularly concerning is how the plan treats Gaza as a dual space: on one hand, it speaks of “integrating Gaza into the national vision,” but on the other, it warns against promising to respond too quickly to people’s immediate needs—such as temporary housing—on the grounds that such interventions might obstruct long-term spatial planning. This exposes the deeper tension between planning logic and survival needs: how can the construction of emergency shelters be strategically postponed while tens of thousands live in tents? Here, the individual is redefined not as a citizen, but as a node within an urban network—planned for, but not necessarily served.

The plan inflates the role of the private sector as the “engine of growth,” advocating for innovative financing models and multilateral partnerships. Yet, it offers no critical reading of the patterns of economic fragmentation or the so-called “economic empowerment” that have produced concentrated elites in Ramallah and Gaza without dismantling existing power structures or achieving real independence.

Development under occupation cannot be neutral. The private sector itself can become a tool for reproducing class hierarchies and geographic centralization unless it is embedded in a broader emancipatory vision. The plan appears enamored with the idea of “multiple actors”—the PA, civil society, donors, investors—but this multiplicity dilutes the fundamental question: Who holds decision-making power? Who sets priorities? Who is accountable? In other words, what we face is decentralized governance without centralized sovereignty. This is not flexibility; it is the reproduction of fragmentation through technical coordination.

In short, PREP is a technocratic–neoliberal plan, apparently guided by strategic international corporate interests in the multi-billion dollar reconstruction project, underlying a vision that reduces politics to implementation, sovereignty to administration, and society to “beneficiaries.” It presents itself as a realistic roadmap for rebuilding Palestine, but it ultimately reproduces the illusion of “reconstruction without liberation.” It addresses the aftermath of war, not its roots. It bets on the economy over justice, on planning over political confrontation. And while it calls for uniting Gaza and the West Bank under a single urban vision, it maintains the conditions of control as an inevitability to be adapted to—not a system to be dismantled.

2. Section Two: The Need for an Alternative Palestinian Vision – Concluding Policy 2. Recommendations

The proliferation of plans and proposals over the past year cannot be understood merely as technical responses to the ongoing war on Gaza. Rather, they must be seen as early attempts to anticipate and reshape the political, social, and spatial order in Palestine through the lens of the “day after.” While this paper has focused on offering a comparative critical analysis of eleven plans with spatial and reconstruction dimensions, its significance lies not only in critique or description,

but in its potential to lay the groundwork for a Palestinian knowledge capital capable of normatively influencing the trajectories of recovery and reconstruction. Accordingly, this concluding section represents an initial attempt to articulate policy standards that can help build an alternative vision—one rooted in internal Palestinian questions, responsive to regional and international dynamics, yet grounded in the political and historical realities of the post-war moment.

2.1 Critical Reading as a Foundational Act

The significance of critically reading “day after” plans lies not only in their technical deconstruction or critique, but in their embodiment of a sovereign act in itself. Analysis here is not simply a review of reconstruction or engineering alternatives—it is a gradual reclamation of symbolic and cognitive decision-making about the future of Palestine. From this perspective, critical reading becomes one of the tools for resisting the sovereign vacuum that many of these plans, in practice, aim to occupy—whether through temporary operational models, sidelining the Palestinian Authority, or transforming reconstruction into an externally managed contract governed by rigid political and security conditions cloaked in development language.

The structure and orientation of most of these plans reveal a lack of recognition of the Palestinian self as a sovereign or epistemic reference—both at the official and popular levels. Therefore, evaluating these plans from within Palestinian political consciousness—not through compliance with “international community” standards or the assessments of its institutions—becomes a political necessity rather than merely a critical choice. Just as reconstruction is not a neutral technical act, its evaluation cannot be separated from the question: *Who has the right to evaluate? And based on which standards?*

The purpose of this examination is not merely to critique the content of the plans or the intentions behind them. Rather, it is to transform the act of reading itself into a foundational moment for reorienting the tools of political and planning action. The more critical Palestinian expertise accumulates in this domain, the more policy arenas can be rebuilt from within—not through reactive engagement with emergency plans or circumstantial dictates, but through the institutionalization of the capacity to critique, engage, propose, and hold accountable.

Thus, the critical reading offered in this paper is not a final analytical chapter, but the drafting of a beginning—an attempt to develop tools and standards that enhance the Palestinian ability to produce vision and pursue aspiration, rather than merely consume what is imposed. This is especially crucial as international interventions continue to shape the future of Palestine, and Gaza in particular.

2.2 Dismantling the Logic of the Proposed Plans

Most of the post-war reconstruction plans cannot be understood outside the epistemological framework that produced them—one that views Palestinians not as political actors or partners in planning, but as passive subjects in a post-catastrophe context. Of the ten plans analyzed in this paper, the majority adopt a superficial developmental and technocratic logic, lacking a structural understanding of the colonial conflict—or deliberately ignoring it in favor of pragmatic approaches that frame reconstruction merely as a tool for population management, conflict de-escalation, or temporary operational facilitation.

These plans treat reconstruction as a financial and engineering operation, designed and authored by international experts and regional funders, while sidelining the sovereign and voluntary agency of Palestinians. Reconstruction is thus transformed into a mechanism of governance, control, and regulation, rather than a path toward transitional justice or comprehensive political and social repair. This framework is often couched in neutral technocratic language, but beneath it lies a soft colonial impulse that produces post-conflict policies as if they are “technical solutions” rather than extensions of geopolitical control and the reconfiguration of Palestinian space under dominant power conditions.

Only a few Palestinian-led initiatives—such as the Gaza Phoenix Plan the National Planning Ministry’s or Gaza 2050, proposal—attempted to incorporate elements of sovereignty and social agency, even if framed within the limitations of existing governance structures. In contrast, most other plans disregard the centrality of justice and fail to acknowledge the legal and political responsibility of the Israeli occupation for the destruction and humanitarian disaster, treating the Palestinian situation as if it were a “natural disaster” with no accountable actor.

To dismantle this logic does not mean to reject all plans wholesale; rather, it means reclaiming the diagnostic capacity to examine how the Palestinian is being reshaped as an object of governance rather than a partner in determining their future. This represents a reconstitution of colonial tools in a modern guise. While the critical readings in this paper reveal how most plans fail to recognize Palestinian agency and instead promote administrative models that reproduce hegemony under the banners of “technical neutrality” and “economic efficiency,” rejecting these plans does not entail abstaining from planning or adopting a merely oppositional stance.

Instead, the influx of externally driven proposals calls for the development of a distinctly Palestinian concept of planning under occupation—one that treats engagement with existing structures as an intrinsic function of planning itself, not as an obstacle. The question posed by this deeper reading is: What makes a plan “feasible” without making it subordinate?

A suitable plan under occupation is not defined by its ability to attract funding or ensure short-term stability, but by its ability to safeguard the national fabric from fragmentation and reject reconstruction as a tool of reconfiguration. In this light, certain plans—such as the Gaza Phoenix Plan, the National Planning Ministry’s, or Gaza 2050 —present a spatial and institutional vision that is at least partially implementable, rooted in local actors and detached from external powers or the Israeli vision for the transitional phase. Similarly, the plan proposed by the Palestinian Ministry of Planning—despite its technical limitations and lack of full readiness—clearly emphasizes sovereignty as a prerequisite for reconstruction, not a product of it.

Conversely, plans built around international reconstruction fund models, or those financed by external corporate actors with conditional investment frameworks, amount to attempts to construct a functional apparatus for reconstruction that is detached from the political will of the Palestinian people. This calls for the development of a clear Palestinian policy on planning under occupation—one that delineates what can be accepted without compromise and what must be rejected, despite financial incentives or political pressure.

2.3 Some Policy Conclusions/Recommendations

2.3.1 Developing a “Normative Matrix” for Assessing Reconstruction Plans

Given the divergence among existing plans and the absence of a unified Palestinian framework to evaluate them, there is a pressing need to produce a national evaluation tool. This tool should be used to examine, scrutinize, and determine the degree of alignment between reconstruction proposals and the principles of rights, sovereignty, and equitable rebuilding.

- **Responsible Actors:** MAS Institute, in collaboration with the Engineers Syndicate, the Ministry of Planning, Palestinian universities, civil society organizations, and expert researchers.
- **Step:** Develop a matrix of 20 criteria encompassing political, legal, spatial, social, and sovereignty-related dimensions. Each criterion would be scored on an incremental scale (e.g., 5 points per criterion).
- **Output:** A national benchmark that can be used to guide, critique, or approve any future reconstruction plan—replacing dependence on donor or international office standards.

2.3.2 Formulating a National Policy Charter for Sovereign Reconstruction

The absence of a unifying Palestinian document to steer reconstruction efforts has allowed agendas to drift toward reproducing dependency. Therefore, a political charter is needed to establish a “red line” that must not be crossed when engaging with any plan or funding proposal.

- **Responsible Actor:** An independent national committee.
- **Step:** Draft a set of foundational principles encompassing justice, representation, transparency, sovereignty, and the indivisibility of Palestine.
- **Output:** A nationally recognized document to serve as a political and ethical reference—or a set of operational guidelines—in negotiations or when assessing any reconstruction plan.

2.3.3 Establishing a Permanent Palestinian Observatory to Track Reconstruction Plans and International Interventions

The growing number of plans, proposals, and funding streams necessitates the creation of a transparent, independent monitoring body to systematically track the alignment of each plan with national standards.

- **Responsible Actor:** A research and professional coalition led by academic institutions, civil society organizations, and unions.
- **Step:** Develop an interactive digital platform to monitor and deconstruct the content of each plan, document international actors, funding sources, and timeframes.
- **Output:** A strategic database to be used for monitoring, counter-planning, and policy-oriented diplomacy.

2.3.4 Articulating a Clear Palestinian Policy for Planning Under Occupation


The continuation of Israeli occupation does not negate the need for planning—but it does require a national policy that clearly distinguishes between managing necessity and reproducing hegemony. Many of the proposed plans—despite appearing humanitarian or developmental—actually extend colonial control when implemented without accountability or Palestinian ownership. What is needed is not just a “suitable” plan, but an official Palestinian policy that defines when, why, and how a reconstruction plan can be developed or accepted under occupation without reinforcing or legitimizing its tools.

- **Responsible Actors:** Office of the Palestinian Prime Minister and the Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, in cooperation with national research centers and civil society representatives.
- **Step:** Draft a national policy document that outlines political criteria for developing or approving any plan under occupation. These criteria should include:
 - Ensuring that no plan compromises political or sovereign rights
 - Requiring meaningful Palestinian agency in decision-making and implementation
 - Tying reconstruction plans to the accountability of the Israeli occupation, not bypassing it
 - Establishing a Palestinian review body to assess externally proposed reconstruction plans (with the authority to approve or reject them based on national interest)
 - This policy can be embedded in the international negotiation discourse with donors and global actors.
- **Output:** Empowering Palestinians to control policy instruments rather than being passive subjects—or worse, commodified and turned into knowledge variables within externally imposed frameworks.

3. Section Three: Comparative Matrix and Analytical Dimensions:

This section presents a comparative matrix offering a cross-cutting analysis of the eleven plans, based on the following dimensions

- **Type of Actor:** State, international organization, research center, donor entity, private sector.
- **Primary Function:** Reconstruction, governance, security, investment.
- **Degree of Palestinian Representation—Official and Popular:** Leadership, partnership, marginalization, exclusion.
- **Security Model:** Local police, international supervision, Israeli guarantees.
- **Economic Structure:** State intervention, free market, privately funded sector.
- **Position on Refugees:** Included, silent.
- **Political Horizon:** Two-state solution, transitional administration, dismantling of Gaza, permanent governance.
- **Level of Coordination with the Palestinian Authority.**
- **Conditionality of Funding and External Intervention**



Plan	Plan Authoring Entity	Implementing Entity	Palestinian Representation	Security Model	Economic Model	Refugees / Right of Return	Political Horizon	Coordination with Palestinian Authority	Conditions and Dependencies
RAND ARC	RAND Corporation	The Palestinian Authority (if sovereignty is achieved) + international donors + coordination with Israel.	Partnership with the Palestinian Authority.	Not detailed: assumes a fully sovereign Palestinian state, but does not specify the security arrangements required to achieve or maintain it.	Proposes a large-scale investment model in infrastructure led by the state and supported by donors, with private sector participation. Requires \$3.3 billion annually over ten years. Aims to build a stable, long-term economic base.	Included	Based on the assumption of an independent Palestinian state as a precondition for implementation. Views the first decade of statehood as a pivotal phase for development and infrastructure. Calls for building infrastructure and economic foundations in anticipation of a political solution.	Assumes full coordination with the Palestinian Authority, particularly with planning bodies. Engages the international community and donors in implementation while emphasizing the PA's role in local leadership.	Requires strong international financial and political commitment (\$33 billion over 10 years). May involve conditions tied to political progress and agreements. Relies on coordination mechanisms like the “International Quartet.”
RAND 2025	RAND Corporation	Palestinian Authority + local partners / local funders + international donors + obligatory coordination with Israel.	Leadership and partnership with the Palestinian Authority.	Assumes official Palestinian security after a political settlement. Does not present a phased security model. Mentions the need for “Palestinian control over crossings,” but without clear security mechanisms.	Based on a mixed model led by private investment, especially from the Palestinian private sector, supported by governmental reforms and donor assistance. Projects are planned in phases alongside institutional reforms.	Silent	Assumes a unified Palestinian state including the West Bank and Gaza in the long term. Proposes transitional scenarios starting with local project implementation before reaching a final political agreement. The vision reflects gradual stages toward statehood with full Palestinian civil and administrative control.	Assumes full integration with the PA. Based on consultations with local officials and experts. Considers the PA the main implementing party of the vision for the future Palestinian state.	Relies on external political and financial conditions, such as reaching agreements with Israel, international support, and long-term funding. Requires improving the conflict environment to enable gradual implementation.
Gaza 2050	The Palestinian private sector (in coordination with the National Spatial Planning Unit) Technical support from AECOM and The Portland Trust.	Palestinian-led initiative involving a coalition of national investment firms and institutions, in coordination with government bodies and civil society, with advisory support from international experts.	Broad national representation encompassing the private sector, government, civil society, and youth, with clear Palestinian leadership in planning, vision, and execution.	None	A long-term development model led by the private sector, focused on the knowledge economy, high-value services, and integration with the West Bank and regional markets, within an investment-friendly environment.	Silent	The plan assumes Gaza's integration into a broader national Palestinian vision, with functional connection to the West Bank, but does not articulate a clear political framework such as a two-state solution or transitional governance.	Full coordination with government institutions, especially the National Spatial Planning Unit and the Ministry of Transportation, aligned with national development plans and formal programs.	The plan does not present explicit political or security conditions, but implicitly assumes openness to economic engagement, international support, and a degree of stability as prerequisites for implementation.

Plan	Plan Authoring Entity	Implementing Entity	Palestinian Representation	Security Model	Economic Model	Refugees / Right of Return	Political Horizon	Coordination with Palestinian Authority	Conditions and Dependencies
IRDNA	The World Bank, the United Nations, the European Union. In coordination with: the Palestinian Authority (especially the Ministry of Local Government and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics).	International organizations in partnership with the Palestinian Authority.	Leadership and partnership with the Palestinian Authority.	None	The model is based on multi-year international funding, combining state intervention (via the Palestinian Authority) and private sector revitalization. It emphasizes transparency and accountability to build institutional trust and stimulate the local market, with a reliance on donor support.	Silent	Does not propose a final political solution, but focuses on a transitional reconstruction phase within the reality of existing division and conflict. Supports the role of the Palestinian Authority in coordination and supervision, without committing to a specific political framework such as the two-state solution.	Demonstrates full coordination with the Palestinian Authority, as the report is prepared in cooperation with the Palestinian government, which is considered a key partner in planning and implementation, while international organizations play a technical and leading role in the assessment.	Directly linked to multiple conditions, including: a ceasefire, coordination with Israel for entry of equipment, sustainable international funding, removal of unexploded ordnance, and continued international recognition of the Palestinian Authority as the plan's leader.
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). Based on: Palestinian national policies, especially the 2023 National Urban Policy.	The United Nations in partnership with the Palestinian Authority.	Leadership and partnership with the Palestinian Authority.	None	The plan follows a hybrid model combining international support and local private sector participation. It emphasizes the use of local labor and construction materials from Gaza, but acknowledges the constraints on imports, which prevent full reliance on a free market.	Silent	Assumes that the two-state solution is the desired framework, but treats the political horizon as uncertain. It presents multiple scenarios including continuation of conflict or the potential opening of corridors for reconstruction. It encourages political negotiations grounded in urban planning realities and housing needs, without imposing a clear political model.	Demonstrates comprehensive and integrated coordination with the Palestinian Authority, through alignment with national policies such as the “National Urban Policy” and “National Development Plan,” along with capacity support for both central and local Palestinian institutions.	The plan relies on several external conditions, such as security de-escalation, facilitation of material entry, Israeli approval of team access, in addition to the need for timely and consistent international funding.
PNA	Palestinian Ministry of Local Government / Ministry of Planning. In collaboration with: Local planning experts and some technical input from international partners.	PA	Comprehensive Palestinian leadership.	Palestinian police and national security, conditional on Israeli withdrawal.	Based on a diversified funding model that includes: state intervention, international financing, private sector investment, and diaspora contributions. Applies blended finance and public-private partnerships (PPPs), alongside Islamic finance tools. A comprehensive and mixed model.	Included	Based on a vision of a unified Palestinian state encompassing Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Rejects any model limited to Gaza alone. Emphasizes restoring national unity and full Palestinian sovereignty, and opposes political or geographic separation.	The plan emphasizes that the Palestinian government is the central and leading authority in planning and implementation. It calls for reintegration of public institutions in Gaza and enhancement of administrative capacity, aiming to overcome the state of division.	Implementation is conditional on: – A permanent ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal – Lifting the blockade on Gaza – Restoring clearance revenues The plan also requires long-term, multi-source funding and regional and international cooperation.

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Arab Proposal	A regional Arab initiative led by the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, with political coordination with the Palestinian leadership	Official Palestinian leadership (Palestinian Authority), under Egyptian–Qatari supervision and facilitation, through stages beginning with a transitional technocratic committee, then the PA's return	Centralized leadership by the PA	Palestinian police under the supervision and training of Egypt and Jordan	State-led economic model through the Palestinian Authority, backed by international funding and partnerships with neighboring states. Includes support for local industries, creation of logistical zones, and renewable energy initiatives. A hybrid model: state-led but reliant on external funding.	Included	Clearly adopts the two-state solution Affirms Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and links it with the West Bank within the borders of June 4, 1967 The plan includes a transitional administration through a six-month administrative committee in Gaza as a prelude to the full return of the PA	The plan clearly affirms full leadership of the reconstruction and governance process by the PA Proposes forming a transitional administrative committee in Gaza to pave the way for the official government's return Coordinated with relevant Palestinian ministries and institutions	The plan is explicitly tied to funding conditions and international political support, including: – Ceasefire – Security training from regional countries – Adherence to international law – Funding is conditional upon political progress
Gaza Phoenix	A group of independent Palestinian architects and researchers. Supported by: Civil society organizations, Palestinian universities (e.g., Birzeit University), and local planning networks.	A local Palestinian societal coalition – including municipalities, academics, and civil institutions – with decentralized leadership and broad community participation.	Partnership with the Palestinian Authority.	Entirely local: relies on community security, municipalities, and participatory governance, without mention of formal security or police institutions.	Proposes a participatory social model integrating circular economy principles. Encourages local production and reuses war rubble. Rejects pure aid or free market models, emphasizing inclusive economic participation across all social classes.	Included	Focuses on local sovereignty and community-led leadership within Gaza. Relies on a grassroots framework aiming for self-determination and bottom-up planning.	Shows decentralized coordination with the Palestinian Authority. Primarily depends on municipalities, universities, and local civil society. Reflects a spirit of local autonomy with partial intersection with PA institutions but no centralized subordination.	Rejects politically conditioned or top-down funding. Calls for local autonomy and financing aligned with residents' priorities. Generally aligns with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) but without subjection to political or international coercion.
Trump–Pelzman	CEES-MENA Research Center, led by Joseph Pelzman Supported by U.S. President Donald Trump	A coalition of international private sector investors (from GCC and other countries), under a 50-year concession contract. These entities are responsible for implementation and civil administration directly.	Complete exclusion of Palestinian involvement in governance during the contract period; Palestinians are reduced to the role of beneficiaries only, without any participation in decision-making or institutional oversight.	The plan promotes a vision of a “sovereign, demilitarized Gaza,” without detailing any local or international security arrangements. No mention is made of an Israeli or international role.	A purely investment-driven model in which the private sector manages all public services and infrastructure (energy, water, education, transportation). It focuses on three main sectors: agriculture, tourism, and high-tech. Financing is based on concession contracts, not international aid, and there is no role for the public sector. The model is entirely profit-oriented and market-driven.	Silent	The plan postpones addressing Palestinian sovereignty until after the 50-year investment contract ends. It fully separates reconstruction from politics, with no mention of a two-state solution or connection to the West Bank.	The plan completely bypasses the Palestinian Authority, granting full authority to investors without any coordinating or political role for Palestinian leadership.	The plan is bound by a legally binding 50-year contract that grants investors temporary executive and legislative control over Gaza. Palestinian sovereignty is made conditional upon the success of the development experiment, effectively turning the right to self-determination into a reward contingent on performance.

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Habtoor	Al Habtoor Center for Political Research (a private UAE institution) Supported by: Emirati investment companies and Gulf financing networks	An Arab–Palestinian alliance led by the private sector, through a joint investment company under Emirati supervision, with a limited but increasing role for the Palestinian Authority	Palestinians are granted 70% ownership in the holding company managing the reconstruction	The plan proposes a multi-layered security model: – Initially, neutral international observers are deployed (e.g., UN or EU) – Demilitarized zones are established with external monitoring – Gradual transition to Palestinian-led local security administration, subject to civil monitoring and accountability – The plan rejects any involvement by Israel in the security model	Proposes a private-public partnership (PPP) model funded by Arab and international investors Focuses on industrial development, entrepreneurship empowerment, and gradual financial reform A regulated market-based model aiming to reduce dependency on aid	Silent	Focuses on Gaza's economic reconstruction without referencing a comprehensive political solution like the two-state model Its political horizon envisions sustainable local governance in Gaza under a gradual Palestinian administrative leadership No clear final status or explicit connection to the West Bank or Jerusalem	Partial coordination with Palestinian institutions Tasks are gradually transferred to Palestinian entities In the first phase, private entities and international actors retain supervisory roles, with indications of developing local capacities	The plan includes explicit conditionality, including: – Phased funding tied to performance evaluations – International oversight from bodies like the World Bank or UN – Security and political guarantees – Adherence to good governance and transparency standards
PREP	A coalition of Palestinian private sector actors and Palestinian economic experts	Multi-level Palestinian leadership (PA + civil society + private sector)	Strong and open civil representation	None	Based on a coordinated model combining state-like planning in terms of infrastructure with private initiative and alternative financing. Does not adopt free market or purely aid-based approaches. Seeks collaboration between local actors, donors, and investors.	Silent	Envisions a future Palestinian state that is independent and integrated, including Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Rejects transitional or Gaza-only frameworks. Opposes fragmented models.	Flexible cooperation that supports partial to full coordination with the PA. Leverages existing national plans, such as transport and road infrastructure. Focuses on collaboration with relevant ministries and donors without making the PA the sole lead entity.	Avoids mentioning strict political preconditions but acknowledges the influence of the political context. Calls for collaborative, condition-flexible funding aligned with Palestinian priorities, relying on trust and institutional accumulation.

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